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The Effect of the 1976 Tax Reform Act
on the Ownership of Professional
Sports Franchises
By CHARLES DICKENSON AND ZOOK SUTON
Members, third year class.
Introduction
D URING the past few years, professional sports franchise' ownershave been dealt serious blows in the judicial arena. Baseball's
ninety-two year old reserve clause,2 football's "Rozelle Rule"3 and the
college draft4 have been either swept aside or significantly altered in
well-publicized decisions. More recently, a less publicized, but no less
effective attack has been mounted against sports franchise owners on
another front. The Internal Revenue Service has become increasingly
intolerant of the tax savings devices that once made team ownership
so attractive. With the Congressional enactment of the Tax Reform Act
of 1976,5 it has become apparent that the federal government wants
to change the rules of the game. -
This note will examine, from a historical perspective, the tax treat-
ment of professional sports franchises with special focus on the impact
of the recently-enacted Tax Reform Act of 1976. To introduce the con-
cepts with which this note will deal, Part I will describe the "tax
sheltering" aspects of team ownership as they existed in the recent past.
Part II will trace the pre-TRA '76 development of depreciation
1. "Franchise" is defined as: "A special privilege conferred by government on
individual or corporation, and which does not belong to citizens of countries generally
of common right." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 786 (4th ed. 1951). With regard to pro-
fessional sports, the government granting the privilege will be the governing league
body composed of representatives of each member franchise.
2. In re Arbitration of Messersmith, Grievance No. 75-27, Decision No. 29 (1975).
A companion grievance heard and decided at the same time was that of David McNally
(Grievance No. 75-28). See also Sobel, The Emancipation of Professional Athletes, 3
W. ST. U.L. REv. 9 (1976).
3. Mackey v. The National Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975),
modified, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
4. Smith v. Pro-Football, 420 F. Supp. 1000 (D.D.C. 1976). See text accompany-
ing notes 82-90.
5. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976) [herein-
after cited as 1976 TRA].
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benefits available to franchise purchasers, and the correlative recapture
of depreciation imposed upon franchise sellers. Inextricably related to
these depreciation benefits and recapture burdens are the different
tax strategies of the buyer and seller with regard to the allocation of
purchase price to franchise assets. The application of these strategies
and attempts by the IRS to limit the buyer's allocation practices will
be discussed.
The note will proceed (in Part II) to an examination of section
1056 and subsection 1245 (a) (4) under the Tax Reform Act. The addi-
tion of section 1056 curtails the use of a tax savings device previously
available to the franchise purchaser by restricting the depreciation of
player contracts. The amendment of section 1245 to add subsection
1245(a) (4) to the Internal Revenue Code is an attempt to limit the
conversion of ordinary income into capital gain by redefining the re-
computed basis element involved in the recapture of ordinary income.
I. THE PROFESSIONAL SPORTS FRANCHISE AS A
TAX SHELTERING DEVICE
Prior to the TRA '76, investment in sports franchises offered the
purchaser two significant tax sheltering advantages: 1) the deferral
of taxable income, and 2) the conversion of ordinary income to capital
gain. This section will introduce the theory and relationship of these
two concepts as they existed before the Tax Reform Act of 1976.
Tax deferral was accomplished by deducting the cost of the de-
preciable assets acquired with the franchise from ordinary income pur-
suant to section 167 of the Internal Revenue Code.0 As will be fully
discussed, player contracts and sports and office equipment are depre-
ciable property.' Typically the greatest part of the total purchase price
of a franchise was allocated to these contracts.8 The resulting depre-
ciation deductions taken on these player contracts were considerable.
These deductions, when set-off against ordinary income, often resulted
in a profitable franchise incurring paper losses for taxation purposes.
6. I.R.C. § 167(a) provides:
(a) General Rule.
There shall be allowed as a depreciation deduction a reasonable allowance
for the exhaustion, wear and tear (including a reasonable allowance for obso-
lescence)-
(1) of property used in the trade or business, or
(2) of property held for the production of income.
7. See text accompanying notes 17 and 20 infra.
8. See S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 88, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 34, 39, 3524 [hereinafter cited as 1976 REPORT].
9. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 9 4TH CONG.
1ST. SESS., TAX SHELTERS: PROFESSIONAL SPORTS FRANCHISES 2 (Comm. Print 1975).
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By organizing as a Subchapter S corporation, or as a partnership, the
owners are able to use these franchise losses to offset their individual
income to the extent of their adjusted basis in the franchise.o An
example will help illustrate the tax advantages of depreciation to
franchise owners.
Assume that in 1970 Mr. Bucks and four partners purchased an es-
tablished professional sports franchise for $10 million. Of this amount,
$1 million was in cash and $9 million was in the form of long term notes.
For this purchase price the partners were entitled to the franchise
rights, sports and office equipment, and player contracts. Assume fur-
ther that for depreciation purposes the partnership allocated 90% of the
purchase price to the depreciable player contracts, 2% to the equipment,
and 8% to the franchise rights. A useful life of five years was adopted
for the purpose of depreciating the player contracts and equipment.
The partnership's income and expenses for the 1970 taxable year appear
below.
Income:
Gate receipts
Television and radio income
Parking and concessions
Total income
Expenses:
Player salaries
Coaches and staff
Interest
Lease rental
Training
Administration and overhead
Total expenses
Net income before depreciation
Depreciation:
Player contracts
Equipment
Total depreciation -
Net loss for year
$3,055,000
1,135,000
-- - 250,000
4,440,000
1,900,000
150,000
-- -- 900,000
-- - -- 150,000
--- 125,000
875,000
-- --- 4,100,000
340,000
- 1,800,000
- 40,000
- -- 1,840,000
1,500,000
10. See I.R.C. § 1374 (subchapter S corporations) and § 702 (partnerships).
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As a result of $9 million having been allocated to the player con-
tracts and depreciated over a five-year useful life, the franchise was
entitled to a first-year player contract deduction of $1.8 million. Prior
to the depreciation expenses, the franchise had a net income of
$340,000. Due to the substantial depreciation deductions, the franchise
shows a $1.5 million net loss for the year. However, each of the four
partners received $68,000 from the franchise's cash flow and was en-
titled to a $300,000 ordinary income loss based on the franchise's net
loss. Each partner was entitled to use this loss to offset other ordinary
income.
However, the $300,000 in ordinary income sheltered in 1970 might
not be avoided indefinitely, but might simply be deferred to a later
date should the player contracts be sold or transferred in a gain trans-
action. This is because player contracts are subject to section 1245 re-
capture of depreciation. Section 1245 provides that, upon disposition
of certain property, any gain to the extent of past depreciation deduc-
tions will be treated as ordinary income." When one player contract
or the entire franchise is sold, gain attributable to the depreciable assets
will be taxed at ordinary income rates. Therefore, the ordinary income
tax liability deferred in 1970 would eventually be paid as the contracts
depreciated are sold individually or in toto with the franchise.
The conversion of this deferred ordinary income into capital gain
was the second tax benefit of sports franchise investment. Basically,
this tax sheltering method was achieved by replacing all of the origin-
ally purchased player contracts, which were subject to large amounts
of recapture liability, with new player contracts that were either non-
depreciable or subject to very little recapture. This conversion was
achieved in three steps. The first step involved fully depreciating and
then disposing of contracts originally acquired. In our example, after
five years, the $9 million allocated to the purchase of player contracts
was fully depreciated. These contracts would be subject to section
1245 recapture of depreciation when sold. However, if the franchise
had retired, abandoned, or sold any of the original players at a loss,
it could avoid recapture.12 This is because section 1245 recaptures
past depreciation deductions only to the extent of gain." Since the
gain recognized in the retirement, abandonment or sale-at-a-loss of
a player contract would be zero, the franchise would not be subject
to recapture upon these dispositions.
11. See I.R.C. § 1245(a) (1), as amended by 1976 TRA.
12. See text accompanying notes 134-35 infra.
13. See I.R.C. § 1245(a)(1), as amended by 1976 TRA.
230 Comm/Ewr [VOL. 1
The second step was to purchase new player contracts. With the
attrition of the players originally purchased with the franchise, the
franchise would be restocked with players whose contracts were either
non-depreciable or had a very low depreciable cost basis. For the pur-
poses of this discussion assume that the new contracts resulted in
$100,000 in depreciation deductions being taken against ordinary
income.
Because the contracts which were subject to a large amount of
recapture were previously disposed of, the franchise upon resale had
the $9 million original deduction effectively insulated from recapture.
Instead, section 1245 recaptured ordinary income on the depreciation
taken on contracts currently involved in the transfer, which was a mere
$100,000.
The final step in the conversion of ordinary income to capital gain
was accomplished through the use of section 1231. As we have seen,
only $100,000 in ordinary income deductions was subject to recapture.
The remainder of the sale price would then have been taxed at capital
gains rates according to section 1231. Section 1231 provides that, if in
the year of sale, recognized gains from the sale of certain property
used intrade or business, exceed such losses, the gain will be considered
capital gain.14 The Commissioner has determined that player contracts
are section 1231 assets.15
Therefore, by depreciating a large percentage of the franchise
acquisition cost in the form of player contracts over a short period, dis-
posing of the contracts, and replacing them with non-depreciable con-
tracts the seller avoided ordinary income tax liability. Through the
operation of section 1231, the seller received capital gains treatment
on the amount received from the sale of player contracts. Thus, the
conversion of ordinary income to capital gain was achieved.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF DEPRECIATION
ADVANTAGES AVAILABLE TO SPORTS
FRANCHISE PURCHASERS
A. Depreciability of Player Contracts
The primary tax incentive in recent years for investment in a sports
franchise has been the benefit of player contracts depreciation. Player
14. See I.RC. § 1231(a) (1)-(2), as amended by 1976 TRA (amendments not rel-
evant to this discussion).
15. Rev. Rul. 67-380, 1967-2 C.B. 291 (dealing with baseball player contracts);
Rev. Rul. 71-123, 1971-1 C.B. 227, 227-28 (extending Rev. Rul. 67-380 to football
player contracts).
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contracts represent only a portion of the purchase price of a given
sports franchise. Upon acquisition, the new owner also receives team
assets which fall into the following categories: (1) a league franchise
and the rights attendant thereto, (2) operating assets (office and sports
equipment), and (3) good-will.' 6
The operating assets, as tangible business property with a deter-
minable useful life, qualify for a depreciation deduction under section
167.17 The franchise itself and the player contracts and good-will
acquired therewith, however, are intangibles. In order for an intangible
to qualify for depreciation, it must be of use "for only a limited period,
the length of which can be estimated with reasonable accuracy."'"
Because a league franchise is not granted for a limited period, and its
useful life cannot be ascertained with reasonable accuracy, it is non-
depreciable.' 9 This is also true of good-will, which is specifically dis-
allowed as a depreciation deduction.20 Contracts, like the franchise and
good-will, are intangibles. However, unlike these two, player contracts
are considered depreciable assets.2 1
Player contracts have not always been treated by the Internal Rev-
enue Service as within section 167. In 1954 the Commissioner ruled
that the "bulk" purchase of contracts (that is, a purchase involving the
acquisition of an entire team) was to be treated as the purchase of one
indivisible asset.2 2 The ruling required that the entire group of con-
tracts be depreciated over the average useful life of the players.23 This
16. Goodwill and operating assets would represent a portion of the purchase price
only upon the acquisition of an established franchise, as opposed to a league grant of
an expansion franchise.
17. See I.R.C. § 167(a). Since the purchase of an ongoing franchise will almost
invariably entail the acquisition of used sports and office equipment, only the straight
line method of depreciation is allowed. One prerequisite to the use of the accelerated
methods of I.R.C. § 167(b)(2)-(4) is that property be new. See I.R.C. § 167(c)(2).
18. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3, T.D. 6452, 26 C.F.R. § 1.167(a)-3; See Houston
Chronicle Publ. Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1240, 1245 (5th Cir. 1973); Polhen v.
Commissioner, 165 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1948).
19. See Laird v. United States, 391 F. Supp. 656, 669 (D.C. Ga. 1975), appealed
docketed, Civil No. 75-2113 (5th Cir. Dec. 9, 1975).
20. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3, T.D. 6452, 26 C.F.R. § 1.167(a)-3.
21. See Rev. Rul. 54-441, 1954-2 C.B. 101, 101-02 (dealing solely with bulk pur-
chases of players' contracts); Rev. Rul. 67-379, 1967-2 C.B. 127, 127-30 (dealing with
individual baseball contracts); and Rev. Rul. 71-137, 1971-1 C.B. (dealing with foot-
ball contracts); 391 F. Supp. at 669.
22. See Rev. Rul. 54-441, 1954-2 C.B. 101, 101-02.
23. Id. It should be noted here that the estimated useful life "is not necessarily the
useful life inherent in the asset, but is the period over which the asset may reasonably
be expected to be useful to the taxpayer in his trade or business." Treas. Reg. § 1.167
(a)-1(b), T.D. 6452, 26 C.F.R. 1.167(a)-1(b). The useful life assigned varies from
sport to sport. It is reported that basketball player contracts are typically treated as
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ruling did not, however, apply to the acquisition of an individual player
contract. Prior to 1967 the cost of such a contract was deductible as
an "ordinary and necessary"' business expense for the taxable year in
which paid or accrued according to section 162.24 This "expensing" of
contracts, rather than capitalizing and depreciating, was based on the
theory that the contracts had a useful life of one year or less. The courts
upheld this practice in litigation involving baseball franchises and
found that baseball's reserve clause did not add to the useful life of
the contracts.2 5
In 1967, the Commissioner ruled that such treatment would no
longer be accorded baseball contracts and that the cost of a uniform
player contract was to be capitalized and depreciated over its useful
life pursuant to section 167.26 The Commissioner reasoned that the
reserve clause, which in effect conferred upon the team exclusive rights
to a player's services for his entire career, resulted in the purchaser of
the contract obtaining an asset with a useful life substantially beyond
the taxable year.27 In 1971 a Revenue Ruling was issued which ac-
having a useful life of three to five years. Klinger, Professional Sports Teams: Tax Fac-
tors in Buying, Owning, and Selling Them, 39 J. TAx 276, 276-77 (1973). With regard
to football, an NFL expansion team was allowed to claim depreciation deductions for
42 veteran player contracts based upon a useful life of 5.25 years. 391 F. Supp. at
670-71.
24. I.R.C. § 162(a) provides: "There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordi-
nary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any
trade or business ..... "
25. See Commissioner v. Pittsburgh Athletic Club, 72 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1934);
Helvering v. Kansas City Am. Ass'n Baseball Co., 75 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1935).
26. See Rev. Rul. 67-379, 1967-2 C.B. 127, 127-30.
27. Id. This ruling also determined that the depreciable cost basis included amounts
incurred upon the purchase of the contract and bonuses paid for signing; that contracts,
as intangibles, would be precluded from the accelerated depreciation methods of §
167(b)(2)-(4); and that no § 38 investment credit would be allowed upon the pur-
chase of a player contract. This ruling was inevitable in light of the operation of the
reserve clause. As noted in Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), af'd, 443
F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1971), af'd, 407 U.S. 258 (1972): "[The player] must sign a Uniform
Player's Contract, the only form of contract permitted between player and club, which
empowers the signing club unilaterally to renew his contract from year to year should
he and the club fail to come to terms on a new agreement. Once signed he is thereafter
forbidden to negotiate toward prospective baseball employment with any club other
than the one to whom he is under contract. Thus, the club has a right to his services
for as long as it wishes to renew his contract, subject only to his right to retire from
baseball." Id. at 273-74.
In 1975 it was held that baseball's reserve clause was not perpetual, and that players
could become free agents by playing out their options. In re Arbitration of Messersmith,
Grievance No. 75-27, Decision No. 29 (1975). However, in light of baseball's new Uni-
form Player's Contract, the Messersmith decision should not affect the operation of Rev.
Rul. 67-379, supra note 21. The contract, as agreed upon by the National League, the
American League, and the Major League Baseball Players' Association, provides in part
that a player may not become a free agent until he has completed at least six years of
major league service. Rider to the Uniform Player's Contract of the National League of
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corded similar treatment to football player contracts.28 The present
policy of the IRS is to treat the contracts of all professional athletes
as depreciable property. 29
B. Past Practice: Tax Strategy of Buyer and Seller on
Team Transfer
As noted above, the purchase of a sports franchise involves the
acquisition of both depreciable and non-depreciable assets. It is to the
buyer's benefit if the greatest portion of the aggregate purchase price
be attributed to the depreciable player contracts so that he may im-
mediately assign a useful life to them and begin taking depreciation
deductions.3 0 Conversely, from the seller's tax perspective, it is most
beneficial that the non-depreciable franchise asset represent the great-
est portion of the acquisition price because any gain realized from the
sale of the non-depreciable franchise is taxed at favorable capital gains
rates.3 1 Moreover, the seller's gain from the transfer of the depreciable
player contracts, to the extent of the depreciation taken, is subject to
the recapture provisions of section 1245 and taxable at ordinary income
rates. 3 2 (However, as will be discussed infra, there are certain situations
wherein recapture can be avoided.33 )
Due to these conflicting interests and the differential tax treatment
accorded gain from the sale of various assets, the tax strategies of the
buyer and seller on the transfer of a franchise will be polar opposites.
The buyer, in order to maximize his depreciation deductions, will seek
to allocate the greatest portion of the aggregate purchase price to the
depreciable player contracts. On the other hand, the seller will seek
to allocate as much as possible to the non-depreciable franchise and
good-will in order to maximize capital gains treatment for any gain
Professional Baseball Clubs and the American League of Professional Baseball Clubs
Agreed to by Clubs and Major League Baseball Players' Association (approved Aug.
6, 1976).
28. See Rev. Rul. 71-137, 1971-1 C.B. 104; see 391 F. Supp. at 658-59.
29. See Hearings on H.R. 10612 Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 637 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Hearings].
30. The acquired operating assets are also depreciable (see text accompanying note
17 supra), but since their value is generally de minimis in relation to the value of the
contracts and the franchise itself, this note will deal primarily with the depreciation of
player contracts.
31. See Rev. Rul. 67-380, 1967-2 C.B. 291; Rev. Rul. 71-123, 1971-1 C.B. 227.
32. Id. Prior to 1967, the seller was not subject to recapture on the sale of player
contracts. Because the contracts were "expensed" according to § 162, rather than de-
preciated under § 167, no recapture tax liability was incurred.
33. See text accompanying notes 134-35 infra, and discussion in section 2(a) (i)
infra.
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realized, and to minimize the amount subject to section 1245 ordinary
income taxation.3 4
The actual practice of buyers of sports franchises in recent years
clearly reflects this tax strategy, and typically, the largest portion of
the purchase price is assigned by them to player contracts.3 1 In basket-
ball franchise transfers, allocations to player contracts of over eighty
percent are not uncommon, and some owners have allocated as much
as 98.4%.3 Detailed figures from other sports are not as readily avail-
TABLE I
ALLOCATION OF INITIAL TEAM ACQUISITION COST
BETWEEN FRANCHISE AND PLAYER CONTRACTS
BY PROFESSIONAL BASKETBALL TEAMS
(In thousands of dollars)
CLUB Total Cost
Al .................... 250
A2 .................... 985
A3 .................... *
A4 .................... 295
A5 ................... 1,550
A6 .................... 452
A7 ................ 20
A8 .................... 606
A9 .................... 800
A10 .................. 255
All .................. 106
ABA TOTAL ............ 4,713
Franchise
250
100
*
15
200
172
20
*
425
255
6
1,443
Player
Contracts
0
885
0
289
1,350
280
0
373
0
100
3,270
Players
as percent
of total
0
89.8
*
94.9
87.1
61.9
0
*
46.9
0
94.3
69.4
* Not Available.
34. The non-depreciable assets include the franchise and good-will. However, as
will be fully discussed in section 2(a)(i) infra, seller can also minimize his recapture
liability by allocating part of the sales price to certain player contracts which have not
been the subject of depreciation deductions.
35. See 1976 REPORT, supra note 8, at 88.
36. See Table 1.
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Players
Player as percent
CLUB Total Cost Franchise Contracts of total
NI .................... 500 250 250 50.0
N2 .................... 5,600 1,100 4,500 80.4
N3 .................... 5,175 1,035 4,140 80.0
N4 .................... 3,600 400 3,200 88.9
N5 .................... 3,437 400 3,037 88.4
N6 .................... 1,250 50 1,200 96.0
N7 .................... 1,016 416 600 59.1
N8 ................... 678 200 478 70.5
N9 .................... 3,635 465 3,170 87.2
N10 .................. 1,157 101 1,056 91.3
N11 .................. 100 100 0 0
N12 .................. 1,907 180 1,727 90.6
N13 .................. 3,496 331 3,166 90.5
N14 ............ _ ... 25 25 0 0
N15 .................. 3,040 50 2,990 98.4
N16 .................. 23 0 23 100.0
N17 .................. 1,434 150 1,284 89.5
NBA TOTAL .......... 36,073 5,253 30,821 85.4
Source, Noll and Okner, "The Economics of Professional Basketball" 1971.
able. It has been reported that baseball contract allocations have ex-
ceeded ninety-eight percent.3 7 In one case, the purchasing entity of
a professional football expansion franchise allocated ninety percent
of its purchase price to player contracts.18
Prior to the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, there was no
statutory rule regarding the manner of allocation of asset value on the
transfer of a sports franchise. The Treasury Regulations provided only
that upon the acquisition of depreciable and non-depreciable business
property in a lump sum "the basis for depreciation cannot exceed an
amount which bears the same proportion to the lump sum as the value
of the depreciable property at the time of acquisition bears to the value
of the entire property at that time."" There is case law to the same
effect. 40
37. See 1976 Hearings, supra note 29, at 637 n.22.
38. This allocation reported on the tax returns of the purchasers of the Atlanta Fal-
cons for the taxable years of 1967 and 1968, became the subject of the litigation in
Laird v. United States, 391 F. Supp. 656. See text accompanying notes 46-63 infra.
39. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-5 (1956).
40. See Harlow v. Davock, 20 T.C. 1075 (1953); C.D. Johnson Lumber Corp., 12
T.C. 348 (1949).
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Due to the lack of clearcut restrictions, franchise buyers and sellers
in the past have successfully managed to implement their tax strategies
in accordance with their own depreciation or recapture considerations.
There was little or no bargaining in the allocation process. Instead, the
buyer and seller independently determined the amount paid or re-
ceived for the different assets, made different allocation in their books
of account, and hoped that both would not be audited by the IRS."
While the IRS did nothing to discourage these divergent allocations
between buyer and seller, it did attempt to limit the buyer's practice
of excessive allocation to the player contracts asset. Until recently,
however, it appeared that the probability of IRS adjustment was low. 4 2
It is reported that between the years 1967 and 1971 the IRS audited
only one professional basketball franchise." In that case the IRS re-
duced the buyer's allocation to the player contracts asset from ninety
percent to fifty percent.4 4 The Service's past treatment of baseball
transfers is indicative of its once-lenient attitude toward allocation. In
two separate transactions wherein contract allocations of 98.5% and
98.4% were reported, the IRS settled with the taxpayers for adjustments
to 91.4% and 79.4%, respectively." In none of these cases did the Service
challenge the basic concept of allocating a certain portion of the pur-
chase price to player contracts for depreciation purposes. The only
matter for owner concern was the extent to which the IRS would adjust
the reported allocation figures.
The IRS has of late demonstrated a reversal of its past policy4"
with regard to the depreciation of player contracts acquired in bulk.
In Laird v. United States47 and First Northwest Industries of America
v. Commissioner"4 the IRS took the position that no part of the fran-
chise purchase price is allocable to player contracts. Laird represents
the first major IRS/franchise owner conflict over player contract valua-
41. See Maher, New Law Cuts Owners' Tax Benefits, L.A. Times, Nov. 30, 1976,4 3, at 9, col. 1.
42. See Okner, Taxation and Sports Enterprises, in GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS
BusINESS 159, 166 (R. Roll ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Okner].
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See 1976 Hearings, supra note 29, at 637.
46. See text accompanying notes 22-23 supra.
47. 391 F. Supp. 456. As previously noted, Laird is presently on appeal to the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, supra note 19.
48. First Northwest Industries, No. 8899-73 (U.S. Tax Ct., Wash., D.C., Dec. 12,
1973), is currently under consideration in the U.S. Tax Court in Seattle, Washington.
This case involves the purchase of a National Basketball Association expansion team,
the Seattle Supersonics.
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tion and depreciation, and merits discussion before we examine the
impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1976.
C. Laird v. United States: The Government Clamps Down
on Buyer's Allocation Practices
Plaintiff was a stockholder of a Subchapter S corporation, the Five
Smiths, Inc., which purchased from the National Football League an
expansion franchise located in Atlanta, Georgia, in 1966. Of the total
cash consideration of $8.5 million paid for the acquired assets, the
corporate owner allocated $50,000 to the cost of the franchise asset,
$727,086 to deferred interest and $7,722,914 to the cost of the forty-
two player contracts and options acquired. The shareholders then took
a first year depreciation deduction on the contracts computed on a
cost basis of $7,722,914. Pursuant to audit, the IRS determined that
only $1,050,000 should be allocated to the contracts and that the re-
mainder of the purchase price, less interest, should be allocated to the
non-depreciable franchise. Disallowance of the depreciation deductions
ultimately led to this litigation.4!) At issue was whether this $7,722,914
cost basis reflected the true acquisition cost of the contracts, or wheth-
er the sum was assigned arbitrarily and erroneously for the purpose of
achieving favorable tax consequences.
Plaintiff taxpayer contended at trial that the contracts allocation fig-
ure was reasonable, as attested to by the fact that the sum was arrived
at through arms-length negotiations between buyer and seller.5o The
IRS countered that implicit in the taxpayer's allocation was the con-
clusion that the television rights5' acquired with the franchise from
the league had a market value of zero which in the Service's view was
clearly erroneous. It argued that the valuation of the contracts was
unreasonably high and for the purpose of achieving favorable tax con-
sequences.5 2 Notwithstanding its past treatment of bulk contract pur-
49. 391 F. Supp. at 658.
50. Id. at 659. Plaintiff's argument here is without merit. Arms-length negotiations
here would not necessarily generate a reasonable sum reflecting economic reality, be-
cause at the time of the negotiations (1965) the sellers of the player contracts were not
subject to § 1245 recapture. See Rev. Rul. 67-380, 1967-2 C.B. 291. Thus, they had no
interest in negotiating a reduced allocation.
51. 391 F. Supp. at 660. The taxpayer's right to receive television revenues arose
pursuant to the sale agreement with the NFL, whereby the Atlanta club was to share
equally with the other 14 member clubs in any single network television contract com-
mencing in 1966. Pursuant to an agreement between the NFL and the CBS television
network, CBS was granted the right to televise NFL games for the four-year term of
1966 through 1969, for a total cash consideration of $79,200,000. Five Smith's pro rata
share of this four-year contract amounted to $4,737,375. Id. at 664.
52. Id. at 660.
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chases,5 3 and its determinations made in the original audit involved
in the present case,5 4 the IRS took the position that no part of the
purchase price was depreciable. It reasoned that the contracts were
part of a bundle of inextricably related assets acquired with the ex-
pansion franchise, none of which were capable of independent valua-
tion for depreciation purposes. In effect, the purchaser acquired one
inseparable asset, the non-depreciable franchise.55 The Service also
argued that the television rights acquired with the franchise were non-
depreciable because they had an indeterminable useful life.56
The court disagreed with the IRS in its contention that an expansion
franchise is a single, non-depreciable asset and held that the player
contracts could be independently valued with reasonable accuracy
and depreciated.5 7 The court, however, agreed that the allocation had
been misguided. It held that the television rights were non-depreciable,
reasoning that the "Five Smith's right to participate equally with the
other member clubs in television contracts during the time Five
Smith's maintained its membership in the NFL had no definite limited
useful life the duration of which could be ascertained with reasonable
accuracy . . ."5
The court found that of the total cost of $8.5 million the television
rights alone bad a market value of $4,277,043 on the date of the sale.59
The court also found that the allocation of $50,000 to the franchise
asset was unreasonably low in that NFL membership included the
following valuable rights and benefits: (1) the exclusive right to ex-
hibit NFL football within a seventy-five mile radius, (2) the right to
participate in the college player draft, trading with other teams and
the waiver system, (3) the benefit of the league administrative serv-
ices6o and (4) the benefit of league rules and regulations restricting
business competition among NFL franchises.61 The court finally deter-
53. See text accompanying notes 22-23 supra.
54. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
55. Because no operating assets are involved in the purchase of an expansion team,
the parties did not contemplate this additional factor in their arguments. See 391 F.
Supp. at 670.
56. 391 F. Supp. at 660.
57. Id. at 671 (the government has appealed this holding, see supra note 19).
58. Id. at 669 (plaintiff taxpayers have appealed this holding, see supra note 19).
59. Id. at 664. The district court discounted Five Smith's pro rata share of the
television contract at the prime interest rate of five percent in order to determine the
market value.
60. These services included the preparation of game schedules, the negotiation of
television contracts, the organization of the college draft, and the resolution of disputes
among member clubs.
61. 391 F. Supp. at 660-61.
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mined that $3,035,000 represented a reasonable allocation to player
contracts,62 and that the remaining $410,871 would be allocated to
the franchise." The net effect of the court's valuation of the acquired
assets was to reduce the purchaser's allocation of ninety percent to
player contracts to a figure representing merely thirty-six percent of
the total consideration.
III. THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976
Barely had owners time to absorb the impact of Laird when another
bombshell hit the pro sports franchise arena. This one was of Congres-
sional origin, in the form of the Tax Reform Act of 1976. Sections 1056
and 1245 (a) (4) deal with the tax sheltering aspects of team ownership.
Section 1056 focuses on limiting the depreciation of player contracts
available to franchise buyers. Section 1245(a) (4) deals with the seller's
end of the transaction by extending the scope of section 1245 recapture.
This note will first examine the basis limitation provision of section
1056.
62. Plaintiff taxpayer offered expert testimony that the player contracts were worth
between $7.3 and $6.8 million. The court rejected this assessment, and finally accepted
the valuation made in a post-trial brief submitted by plaintiff which was based on the
testimony of the Falcon's first coach. The court held that this testimony, which anal-
yzed veteran players and compared them among themselves and to various college
rookies, proved with reasonable certainty that the fair market value of the player con-
tracts was $3,035,000. Id. at 666-67.
63. Id. at 671. The following chart, appearing at page 671 of the opinion, sets forth
the court's allocation procedure.
TOTAL CONSIDERATION PAID BY
FIVE SMITHS 8,500,000.02
MINUS: Items not in dispute
(a) Membership fee 50,000.00
(b) Interest +727,086.00
777,086.00 -777,086.00
EQUALS: Total Amount in Dispute 7,722,914.02
MINUS: Minimum Present Value
of Television Rights 4,277,043.00 -4,277,043.00
EQUALS: Remainder of Purchase Price Available
for Allocation to Remaining Assets
Acquired 3,445,871.02
MINUS: Amount allocated to Player Contracts 3,035,000.00 -3,035,000.00
EQUALS: Remainder to Be Allocated to 410,871.02
the Franchise
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A. Basis Limitation and Allocation Restriction
Provisions: Section 1056
Section 1056 establishes definitive rules for the treatment of player
contracts upon the acquisition of a sports franchise. Basically, this
section provides for (1) a player contract cost basis limitation, (2) a
binding contract allocation scheme, and (3) a rebuttable presumption
that not more than fifty percent of the purchase price is allocable to
player contracts.64
64. Section 1056 states:
(a) General Rule. - If a franchise to conduct any sports enterprise is sold
or exchanged, and if, in connection with such sale or exchange, there
is a transfer of a contract for the services of an athlete, the basis of
such contract in the hands of the transferee shall not exceed the sum of-
(1) the adjusted basis of such contract in the hands of the transferor
immediately before the transfer, plus
(2) the gain (if any) recognized by the transferor on the transfer of
such contract.
For purposes of this section, gain realized by the transferor on the transfer
of such contract, but not recognized by reason of section 337(a), shall
be treated as recognized to the extent recognized by the transferor's
shareholders.
(b) Exceptions. - Subsection (a) shall not apply-
(1) to an exchange described in section 1031 (relating to exchange of
property held for productive use or investment), and
(2) to property in the hands of a person acquiring the property from
a decedent or to whom the property passed from a decedent (within
the meaning of section 1014(a)).
(c) Transfer Required to Furnish Certain Information. - Under regulations
prescribed by the Secretary, the transferor shall, at the times and in the
manner provided in such regulations, furnish to the Secretary and to
the transferee the following information:
(1) the amount which the transferor believes to be the adjusted basis
referred to in paragraph (1) of subsection (a),
(2) the amount which the transferor believes to be the gain referred to
in paragraph (2) of subsection (a), and
(3) any subsequent modification of either such amount.
To the extent provided in such regulations, the amounts furnished pursuant
to the preceding sentence shall be binding on the transferor and on the
transferee.
(d) Presumption as the Amount Allocable to Player Contracts. - In the case
of any sale or exchange described in subsection (a), it shall be pre-
sumed that not more than 50 percent of the consideration is allocable
to contracts for the services of athletes unless it is established to the
satisfaction of the Secretary that a specified amount in excess of 50 per-
cent is properly allocable to such contracts. Nothing in the preceding
sentence shall give rise to a presumption that an allocation of less than
50 percent of the consideration to contracts for the services of athletes
is a proper allocation.
Note that this section applies to "any sports enterprise." I.R.C. § 1056(a). Thus,
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Subsection (a) provides that, pursuant to the sale or exchange of
a sports franchise, the cost basis of the transferee's contracts acquired
therein shall not exceed the adjusted basis of the contract in the hands
of the transferor immediately before the sale, plus any gain recognized
by the transferor on the exchange.65 Subsection (b) carves out two
exceptions to this cost basis limitation provision. It provides that sub-
section (a) shall not apply to like kind exchanges under section 1031,
nor to property passing from a decedent within section 1014(a) .66 The
most common like kind exchanges in the sports industry involve trades
of individual player contracts made between two different teams. How-
ever, the exception for like kind exchanges does not contemplate this
type of exchange. Section 1056 deals only with situations wherein the
franchise itself ("any sports enterprise"") is exchanged. The wholesale
exchange of franchises between owners is a rare occurrence.68
As to the mechanics of the player contract valuation, subsection (c)
provides a means of regulating both buyer's and seller's allocation
practices. The transferor is required to submit to the Secretary of the
Treasury and to the transferee the following information: (1) the
it is applicable not only to professional baseball, basketball, and football, but also to
the North American Soccer League, World Team Tennis, the World Hockey Associa-
tion, the National Hockey League, the North American Lacrosse League, professional
volleyball, and professional women's softball. The section applies to the sale or exchange
of any franchise after December 31, 1975.
65. I.R.C. § 1056(a)(1)-(2), as amended by 1976 TRA. With regard to the non-
recognition of gain pursuant to corporate liquidations under I.R.C. § 337(1), § 1056(a)
provides that unrecognized gain shall be treated as recognized to the extent recognized
by the transferor's shareholders.
66. I.R.C. § 1056(b)(1)-(2), as amended by 1976 TRA. In Rev. Rul. 67-380,
1967-2 C.B. 291, the Service ruled that trades of baseball player contracts are like kind
exchanges within I.R.C. § 1031(a) and that gain is recognized on such exchanges only
to the extent of the "boot" received. This treatment was extended to football player
contracts in Rev. Rul. 71-137, 1971-1 C.B. 104. For further discussion see text accom-
panying notes 128-31 infra.
67. See I.R.C. § 1056(a), as amended by 1976 TRA.
68. However, consider the tax consequence of this interesting three-way transaction,
as described in Okner, supra note 42, at 176: "The transaction involved Carroll Rosen-
bloom, former owner of the Baltimore Colts; the estate of the late Daniel Reeves, owner
of a majority interest in the Los Angeles Rams at the time of his death; and Robert
Irsay, the current owner of the Colts. Rosenbloom wanted to sell the Colts and acquire
another football team. After the death of Reeves, the Reeves estate and other Rams
stockholders were willing to sell their stock for approximately $19 million. Irsay was
willing to buy the Colts from Rosenbloom for $19 million, but Rosenbloom was reluctant
to sell because he would have to pay $4 to $6 million in capital gains tax. So instead
of buying the Colts, Irsay purchased the Rams for $19 million, and then he and Rosen-
bloom swapped the Los Angeles and Baltimore assets. If the trade qualifies as a tax-
free exchange of like assets, Rosenbloom will avoid the $4 to $6 million capital gains
on the 'sale,' and the Reeves estate will pay little or no tax because of the increased
basis of its Rams stock." (Footnotes omitted.)
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amount which the transferor believes to be the adjusted basis of the
contracts immediately before the franchise transfer, and (2) the
amount which the transferor believes to be the gain recognized by
reason of the transfer.", By providing that these figures be binding on
both the buyer and the seller, the new code section effectively elimin-
ates the possibility of independent allocation by the buyer and seller.
That the buyer and seller should be bound by the same allocation
figures seems only reasonable, and section 1056 (c) merely requires
that the parties conform to sound tax accounting practices.
In allowing the transferor to make the contract valuation, without
specifically providing for input by the transferee, this subsection may
at first blush seem to make possible a unilateral allocation in a manner
favoring the transferor's tax strategy. The seller, for example, could
value the contracts at an unreasonably low figure,70 thereby minimizing
his recapture tax liability, while at the same time unfairly depriving
the buyer a realistic cost basis for depreciation. However, this provision
contemplates that the parties will jointly determine the basis allocable
to the contracts during their arms-length negotiations. The reasoning
seems to be that, given the adverse interests of the parties, their de-
terminations should reflect the economic realities of the acquisition.
The Tax Reform Act provides another limitation on the buyer's
allocation practice. Subsection 1056 (d) establishes a presumption that
not more than fifty percent of the consideration is allocable to the
player contracts asset. The presumption is rebuttable upon a satisfac-
tory showing to the Secretary of the Treasury that a specified amount
over fifty percent is properly allocable to the contracts.
As a whole, the provisions of section 1056 will work to substantially
reduce the tax sheltering effect of team ownership. This will be ac-
complished through the cost basis limitation provision of subsection
(a), the subsection (c) requirement that basis determinations be bind-
ing on both parties to the exchange, and the fifty percent allocation
presumption of subsection (d).
1. SUBSECTION 1056 (c): THE DISINTERESTED SELLER
PROBLEM
The desired goal of this legislation is that buyers and sellers con-
form to sound and economically realistic tax accounting principles
with regard to their asset allocation procedures. As demonstrated, the
69. See I.R.C. § 1056(c)(1)-(2), as amended by 1976 TRA.
70. The buyer is, of course, limited by the 50% presumption of I.R.C. § 1056(d),
discussed infra.
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buyer's primary tax consideration upon acquisition is to establish a
substantial player contract cost basis for depreciation purposes. Con-
versely, it is in the seller's interest to realize a low book gain on the
non-depreciable assets in order to minimize recapture tax liability. In
the past, problems arose when the parties allocated independently
according to these divergent interests. The problem was not so much
that one party over- or under-valued a given asset but that neither was
held accountable for the difference. As a result, the government was in
many instances, deprived of tax revenue.
By precluding independent allocation by the buyer and seller, sub-
section (c) will in many cases prove to be efficacious in minimizing the
sheltering effect of sports franchise ownership. This is because the ad-
verse tax interests of the parties should result in an honest and realistic
appraisal of the different asset values, rather than one which favors one
party to the exclusion of the other. However, as will be discussed fully
infra, in certain situations the seller will be subject to little if any re-
capture liability on the sale of the player contracts, and will therefore
be disinterested in the allocation. Such a situation would occur if the
players involved in the transfer had been selected through the player
draft (without having been paid bonuses for signing) rather than hav-
ing been acquired by the purchase of their respective contracts. Under
these circumstances, the interests of the seller would not be adverse
to those of the buyer because the seller would not be harmed by a high
allocation to player contracts. To the contrary, the seller might benefit
from such an allocation. If the seller agrees to the allocation, the buyer
will be granted a larger depreciable cost basis, and may thus be willing
to pay more for the franchise.
Thus, to the extent that the seller is disinterested in the allocation,
subsection 1056(c) does not effectively deal with the allocation manip-
ulation problem. Further regulation of the buyers and sellers in this
regard was therefore necessary. The solution of the reformers was
apparently the limitations outlined in subsection 1056(d).
2. THE FIFTY PERCENT PRESUMPTION: A REASONABLE
LIMITATION?
The most unpalatable provision of the new law to franchise owners
and prospective buyers is the rebuttable presumption under subsection
1056(d) that not more than fifty percent of the team acquisition cost is
allocable to player contracts." This provision marks a substantial
71. The team owners, team attorneys and league officials of the various sports do
not object to the provisions of subsections (a) or (c). See 1976 Hearings, supra note
29, at 616, 618, 630, 646, 653. They do, however, adamantly oppose the subsection (d)
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change from past allocation practices,12 and will sharply reduce the
depreciation deductions available to franchise purchasers.13
In light of the Laird decision, wherein it was determined that only
thirty-six percent of the acquisition cost of a football expansion fran-
chise was allocable to player contracts, a fifty percent presumption
might not seem unrealistically low. But the Laird determination was
made in 1975 in the context of a unique factual situation, a Nation-
al Football League expansion team purchased in 1966. Subsection
1056(d), however, applies without limitation to the sale of a franchise
for "any sports enterprise" (thus including such enterprises as World
Team Tennis and the North American Soccer League) whether or not
that enterprise is an expansion franchise or an established franchise.
When one considers the dissimilarities among different teams in a
given sports league, and the much greater differences among sports
(for example, as between professional baseball and professional volley-
ball), the validity of any presumption is questionable.
Laird is the only case in which the question of allocation of the
acquisition cost of a sports franchise had been litigated.74 Assuming
that the result was a proper one given the facts and circumstances of
that case, it would seem reasonable to use Laird as an analytical model
by which to examine the asset values of other sports franchises. Using
the district court's rationale, one can compare the relative asset values
of different sports enterprises in an effort to assess the reasonableness
of an across-the-board fifty percent presumption for player contracts.
The allocation determination of Laird and the subsection 1056(d) pre-
sumption will first be viewed in the context of other professional
football franchise transfers.
Upon close examination, the purchase of the Atlanta Falcons, which
was the focus in Laird, involved materially different factors than those
presumption. They argue that the provision is too broad; that it does not account for
the differences in sports; and that the IRS is perfectly capable of handling contract
valuation problems on a case-by-case basis. See 1976 Hearings, supra note 29, at 617-19,
630. Allocation problems will still be handled on a case-by-case basis, but as a result
of subsection (d), a great many more cases will be examined. The IRS is now com-
pelled to examine each transaction wherein the buyer attempts to rebut the subsection
(d) presumption.
72. See text accompanying notes 35-38 supra.
73. The Senate Committee on Finance, in its amendments to the House bill, recom-
mended that the 50% presumption be deleted. The Committee felt that the binding
allocation dealt directly with depreciation problems, and that any further regulation
was unnecessary. See 1976 REPORT, supra note 8, at 89. This recommendation was
adopted by the Senate in its text of H.R. 10612 as passed by the Senate on August 9,
1976. 1976 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) CCH Special 9, Extra Edition of Report No.
37, Aug. 18, 1976.
74. 391 F. Supp. 656. See supra notes 30-31 and text accompanying.
No. 1] TRA '76: SPORTS FRANCHISE OWNERSHIP 245
which exist in the present day purchase of either an expansion fran-
chise or an established franchise. It can be demonstrated that these
differences will affect the relative allocation of acquisition cost to the
various team assets, and cast doubt on the reasonableness of the now
codified allocation presumption.
Initially, a difference between an established team and an expansion
team must be observed in that the purchase of an expansion team in-
volves the acquisition of players of lesser quality than would be ac-
quired in the transfer of an established team. The Atlanta Falcons
received their forty-two players through an "expansion draft" where-
by three players were chosen from each of the fourteen NFL mem-
ber clubs. However, each team was allowed to protect, or "freeze",
twenty-nine of their forty players,"5 leaving open for selection their
least valuable eleven players. It seems clear that the portion of the
total consideration reasonably allocable to these player contracts should
be substantially less than that allocable to contracts acquired in the
purchase of a championship team having more valuable players.7"
In Laird, only thirty-six percent or $3,035,000, was allocated to
player contracts. However, of the total consideration of $8.5 million,
$5,054,129 was allocated to what in effect were fixed costs, i.e., an
undisputed $777,086 to the NFL membership fee and deferred inter-
est, and $4,277,043 to the capitalized value of the four-year CBS tele-
vision contract. " The remaining $3,445,871 represented the amount
available for allocation to both the player contracts asset and the
franchise asset.
Herein lies the importance of the expansion team/established team
distinction. Had the Laird situation involved the purchase of a success-
ful established team, the acquisition cost would have been substan-
tially greater than the $8.5 million paid for the Atlanta Falcons.78 The
difference in cost would have been, for the most part, due to the fact
75. 391 F. Supp. at 663.
76. To evidence the fact that the player roster of an expansion team has a larger
number of sub-standard players (whose contracts are, therefore, less valuable), con-
sider the 1976 NFL expansion teams, the Tampa Bay Buccaneers and the Seattle Sea-
hawks, whose players were selected through expansion drafts, and whose records were
0 wins - 14 losses, and 2 wins - 12 losses, respectively.
77. The $4,277,043 figure was by no means arbitrary, or even difficult to determine.
It was arrived at by determining the team's pro rata share of the amount to be paid
the NFL by CBS over the 4-year contract period, and by discounting that figure by
the prime interest rate of 5%. Id. at 664.
78. The San Francisco 49ers changed hands in February of 1977 for an estimated
$17 million, with indemnities and other obligations increasing the total cost to approx-
imately $22 million. S.F. Chronicle, Feb. 25, 1977, at 55, col. 1.
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that the established team consisted of higher quality players of proven
ability.7" Given the allocation rationale of Laird, and an identical tele-
vision contract, but assuming that the established team had cost a mere
$4 million dollars more than did the Falcons, the reasonable alloca-
tion to player contracts would have been well above the fifty percent
presumption. Seen in this light, the subsection 1056(d) fifty percent
presumption seems arbitrarily low.
Additionally, certain developments since Laird and the drafting
of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 have tended to diminish the value of
all NFL franchises. The first of these was the recent district court de-
cision in Smith v. Pro Footballso ruling the NFL player draft illegal
as a violation of federal antitrust laws.8' The court in Smith suggested,
however, that the NFL could devise alternatives that would meet legal
standards. 2 As a result of this decision, the NFL owners and the NFL
Players Association have agreed upon a modified version of the draft to
be conducted for the first time in April of 1977.8 Whether this revised
scheme is legally sufficient is a question which must await future liti-
gation. The fact that this modified draft is generally less beneficial to
the franchise owners, together with the current uncertainty regarding
its legality should have some impact on the relative valuation of team
assets. As the court found in Laird, the right to participate in and
obtain players through the college draft was one of the "substantial
and valuable rights" attendant to owning an NFL franchise." To the
extent that this valuable right to select players without competitive
bidding and at little or no acquisition cost has been impaired, the value
of the franchise asset is diminished and, therefore, the proportionate
value of the player contracts asset is increased.
Another recent court decision, Mackey v. National Football
79. The higher cost would also be partly attributable to good-will and to the value
of the sports and business equipment acquired with the team, neither of which would
be involved in the purchase of an expansion team. Another variable to be considered
is the franchise location. With few exceptions, a franchise's profitability is determined
by its ability to win games, which is directly related to the quality of its athletes, not
its location. However, certain franchise areas traditionally attract a greater gate than
others. Noll, Attendance and Price Setting in GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BUSINESS
115 (R. Noll ed. 1974).
80. 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976).
81. See Sherman Anti-Trust Act, §§ 1-3, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1970); Clayton Act
§ 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
82. 420 F. Supp. at 747.
83. S.F. Chronicle, Feb. 18, 1977, at 63, col. 1. The draft revisions are part of a
five-year, $107 million collective bargaining agreement. The contract was ratified by a
95% vote of the NFL Players Association members. S.F. Chronicle, March 26, 1977,
at 39, col. 6.
84. 391 F. Supp. at 660.
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League,85 has struck down football's "Rozelle Rule" as an unreasonable
restraint of trade at common law and a per se violation of the Sherman
Anti-trust Act." The rule had provided that when a player had played
out the standard option year and signed as a free agent with another
club, the signing team was required to compensate the athlete's former
club. If compensation conflicts occurred, the NFL Commissioner (Pete
Rozelle) was empowered to determine a fair compensation either in
the form of draft choices or other players. The court in Mackey found
that the rule unfairly restricted the player's rights to negotiate with
other teams after having completed their contracts, and restricted their
ability to move from one team to another.7 As a result of the decision
owners now have less control over their players, and the once-valuable
rights of the franchise to be compensated for their loss is diminished.
This decrease in the value of the rights attendant to the franchise asset
means that the relative value of the player contracts asset is increased.
There are also major differences among sports which effect asset
values, and which tend to make a blanket fifty percent presumption
questionable. One such difference which sets baseball and hockey
apart from other sports is their characteristic two-tier league systems.
These sports are structured such that each consists of a "major" and
a "minor" league. The minor leagues are a training and develop-
ment ground for younger players. Most hockey and baseball players,
after signing, are sent to the minor leagues for a certain number of
years in preparation for major league participation.88 The player de-
velopment costs incurred in this system are substantial. 9 Bowie Kuhn,
the Commissioner of Baseball, has testified that, between the years
1969 and 1973, baseball team owners spent over $160 million to train
players in their minor league system.Y0 The cost to develop each base-
ball player graduated to the major league level is estimated to be
$500,000.9 Professional hockey teams incur similar development costs,
often in the form of subsidies to the minor league and amateur teams.9 2
85. 407 F..Supp. 1000
86. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1970).
87. 407 F. Supp. at 1006.
88. 1976 Hearings, supra note 29, at 618.
89. Id. at 631.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 618. Robert 0. Swados, special tax counsel to the NHL, testified before
the Senate Finance Committee that between 1971 and 1976 the NHL paid $5 million
in subsidies to amateur hockey. In addition, each NHL club paid an average subsidy
of $300,000 to professional minor league clubs.
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This two-tier league system does not exist in other sports. Rookie
players in football and basketball are placed directly on the active team
roster after college though the player draft.9 3 Colleges, rather than
the professional teams, provide the training ground and incur the
"development costs" for potential professional players. Thus, a base-
ball or hockey player under a major league contract represents a much
greater proportional investment than does a football, basketball or
tennis player. To this extent, the player contracts in the former two
sports should, if realistically valued, represent a relatively greater pro-
portion of a franchise acquisition cost than in other sports.
Another consideration which makes questionable a blanket allo-
cation presumption is the variable factor of television contract revenue
in the professional sports arena. As we have seen from Laird, which
involved 1966 dollar figures, this revenue is tremendous in professional
football. The value of television rights alone in Laird was in excess of
fifty percent of the purchase price, leaving little to allocate to player
contracts. In this context, the subsection 1056(d) presumption does not
seem unduly harsh on franchise owners. Consider, however, the dra-
matic results had there been no league television contract involved in
the purchase. The total purchase price (absent the value of the tele-
vision rights) would have been approximately $4,220,000 with the
player contracts asset representing over seventy percent of the total
consideration. Thus, television rights acquired with a franchise, the
value of which is fixed by an independent contract, determine the
upper dollar limit that can be allocated to player contracts. The impli-
cations of inter-sport and intra-sport broadcast revenue disparities thus
bear heavily on an assessment of this indiscriminate fifty percent
presumption.
With regard to inter-sport television revenue disparities, it is well
known that certain sports have much more lucrative television contracts
than other less popular sports. The figures for the total revenue from
local and national broadcast rights from 1967 through 1969 for hockey,
baseball and. football are illustrative. While each football franchise
received some $4,034,000 during this period and each baseball fran-
chise $3,628,000, each National Hockey League franchise received
only $350,000..4 At present, most sports leagues, including the NHL
and World Team Tennis, have no national television contract. Thus,
93. However, some players can enter the professional leagues prior to college grad-
uation if they can qualify as an economic "hardship" case.
94. Horowitz, Sports Broadcasting in GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BUSINESS (R.
Noll ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Horowitz].
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broadcast revenue for these franchises is derived from local or syn-
dication broadcasting agreements.
Also, the value of broadcast contracts can vary among different
teams in a given sport. Football generally exhibits less interclub dis-
parity than other sports. For example, in 1970, all of the twenty-six
professional football teams received between $1.7 and $1.9 million in
broadcast revenue.1" Baseball evidences a greater disparity. For in-
stance, in 1977, the local television and radio revenue rights ranged
from $2 million (Boston Red Sox) to $350,000 (Kansas City Royals)."
The extremes in hockey in 1967 ranged from $500,000 in Los Angeles
to $190,000 in Pittsburgh. 97 The disparity also exists in basketball. For
the 1971-2 season, each NBA franchise received $325,000 from a na-
tional broadcast contract, plus additional revenue from local con-
tracts." At the same time, the ABA teams had no national contract,
and some received no local broadcast revenue.9" It is apparent from
these figures that the allocable portion of team purchase price to tele-
vision rights can vary significantly among different teams in a given
sport. A franchise purchase involving little or no television revenue
will realistically require a much greater proportionate allocation to
player contracts than would a purchase involving a multi-million dol-
lar television contract. To the extent that subsection 1056(d) does not
distinguish among sports, and applies with equal force and effect to
different teams in a given sport, it is arguable that this section is arbi-
trary and unduly harsh on purchasers of franchises with broadcast
rights of minimal value.
The preceeding observations compel the conclusion that this fifty
percent presumption is unreasonably low when taken at face value.
There is, however, room for flexibility and an element of discretionary
judgment by the IRS in its application in that the presumption is re-
buttable. The reasonableness and viability of section 1056 in effecting
tax reform in this area would thus seem to depend upon how difficult
the IRS makes it for a buyer to establish "to the satisfaction of the
Secretary" that an allocation to player contracts in excess of fifty
percent of the purchase price is proper. If the Service is adamant
in adhering to a fifty percent allocation for every franchise purchase,
without regard to the realistic determinations of the parties, the new
95. Id. at 291.
96. The Sporting News, April 9, 1977 at 38, col. 4.
97. Horowitz supra note 94, at 291.
98. Id.
99. Id. The NBA and the ABA have since merged.
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section will constitute an arbitrary and unduly harsh attack on pro-
fessional sports franchise ownership, with the effect of curtailing future
investment. 00
B. Recapture of Depreciation: Section 1245
The second provision of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 to affect sports
franchises deals with recapture of depreciation taken with respect to
player contracts. In general, depreciable property, when sold, is subject
to recapture under section 1245, and any gain realized that is attribut-
able to previous depreciation deductions will be treated as ordinary
income. The gain to be taxed at ordinary income rates is determined
by subtracting the undepreciated adjusted basis in the property from
the lesser of recomputed basis or amount realized. The recomputed
basis is the first figure to check. Recomputed basis can be computed by
adding the adjusted basis of the property and the depreciation deduc-
tions taken with respect to the property.10 If the amount realized from
the transaction is less than the recomputed basis, it will be utilized. In
short, by determining the recomputed basis and the amount realized
and subtracting the adjusted basis from the lesser of the two figures,
one can determine the amount of depreciation deductions that is to
be recaptured at ordinary income tax rates.
As previously noted, the amounts paid or incurred upon the pur-
100. During the 1976 Hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance on H.R.
10612 Bowie Kuhn, the Commissioner of Baseball, and others voiced their strong ob-
jections to the 50% presumption. At the conclusion of the hearings, this interesting
dialogue between the Committee Chairman and Mr. Kuhn took place:
The Chairman: Mr. Kuhn, my Uncle Earl used to like to refer to the bug under
the chip; what the thing was really about. I want to see what your reaction is to this:
I have heard a rumor that the whole purpose of all this, some of which for a ridiculous
tax law, is to cause you people to put a baseball team back here in Washington, D.C.
Have you heard that? Has that thought ever occurred to you?
Mr. Kuhn: I have heard the rumor, and the thought has occurred to me.
The Chairman: All I can say is, it is one hell of a way to write a tax law.
101. The regulations define recomputed basis in Section 1.1245-2:
(a) General rule-
(1) Recomputed basis defined. The term "recomputed basis" means, with
respect to any property, an amount equal to the sum of-
(i) The adjusted basis of the property, as defined in section 1011, plus
(ii) The amount of the adjustments reflected in the adjusted basis.
(2) Definition of adjustments reflected in adjusted basis. The term "adjust-
ments reflected in the adjusted basis" means-
(i) With respect to any property other than property described in sub-
division (ii), (iii), or (iv) of this subparagraph, the amount of the
adjustments attributable to periods after Dec. 31, 1961, . . . which
are reflected in the adjusted basis of such property on account of
deductions allowed or allowable for depreciation or amortization . ..
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chase of player contracts and bonuses paid to players for signing player
contracts are depreciable.""' The addition of subsection 1245(a) (4)
to the Internal Revenue Code by the Tax Reform Act of 1976 modifies
the general recapture provision with regard to player contracts in-
volved in the sale of a franchise by instituting a new procedure for
determining recomputed basis.1 3 Basically, the recomputed basis for
recapture purposes will be the greater of previously unrecaptured de-
preciation on player contracts either involved in the transfer of the
franchise or acquired by the seller upon acquisition of the franchise.
102. Rev. Rul. 67-380, 1967-2 C.B. 291; Rev. Rul. 71-137, 1971-1 C.B. 104.
103. The special rule for the computation of recapture on player contracts is found
in subsection 1245(a)(4).
(4) Special Rule for Player Contracts
(A) In General. - For purposes of this section, if a franchise to conduct any
sports enterprise is sold or exchanged, and if, in connection with such sale
or exchange, there is a transfer of any player contracts, the recomputed basis
of such player contracts in the hands of the transferor shall be the adjusted
basis of such contracts increased by the greater of-
(i) the previously unrecaptured depreciation with respect to player con-
tracts acquired by the transferor at the time of acquistion of such
franchise, or
(ii) the previously unrecaptured depreciation with respect to the player
contracts involved in such transfer.
(B) Previously Unrecaptured Depreciation With Respect To Initial Contracts.
-For purposes of subparagraph (A)(i), the term 'previously unrecaptured
depreciation' means the excess (if any) of-
(i) the sum of the deduction allowed or allowable to the taxpayer trans-
feror for the depreciation of any player contracts acquired by him
at the time of acquisition of such franchise, plus the deduction al-
lowed or allowable for losses with respect to such player contracts
acquired at the time of such acquisition, over
(ii) the aggregate of the amounts treated as ordinary income by reason
of this section with respect to prior dispositions of such player con-
tracts acquired upon acquisition of the franchise.
(C) Previously Unrecaptured Depreciation With Respect To Contracts Trans-
ferred. - For purposes of subparagraph (A) (ii), the term 'previously unre-
captured depreciation' means-
(i) the amount of any deduction allowed or allowable to the taxpayer
transferor for the depreciation of any contracts involved in such
transfer, over
(ii) the aggregate of the amounts treated as ordinary income by reason
of this section with respect to prior dispositions of such player con-
tracts acquired upon acquisition of the franchise.
(D) Player Contract - For purposes of this paragraph, the term 'player con-
tract' means any contracts for the services of an athlete which, in the hands
of the taxpayer, is of a character subject to the allowance for depreciation
provided in section 167.
(2) Effective Date - The amendment made by this subsection applies to
transfers of player contracts in connection with any sale or exchange of a franchise
after December 31, 1975.
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This amendment does not affect the recapture treatment in in-
dividual player contract transactions which are handled under the
general provisions of section 1245.104 These transactions include nego-
tiations with new players, purchasing player contracts from other
teams, acquiring player contracts through trades, trading a draft choice
for a player contract, and abandoning player contracts. This portion
of the note will first examine the treatment of individual player trans-
actions under the general provisions of section 1245. Secondly, the
treatment of the recapture of ordinary income on player contracts
transferred in bulk upon the sale of a franchise under the new sub-
section 1245(a) (4) will be discussed.
1. INDIVIDUAL PLAYER CONTRACT TRANSACTIONS
a. NEGOTIATIONS WITH NEW PLAYERS
Many player contracts are obtained through negotiations between
the individual athlete and the franchise. Although such negotiations
may result in a wide spectrum of compensation schemes, the basic
distinction that must be made for accounting and taxation purposes
is whether the stipend is a salary for services performed or a bonus
for signing the contract.'", If characterized as a salary, the team may
deduct as an ordinary and necessary business expense the total amount
in the year paid. 00 This is possible because a salary is considered to be
payment for services rendered solely within the taxable year. On the
other hand, a bonus to sign a contract having a length of greater than
one year is considered an inducement to enter into a multi-year agree-
ment.1 07 As such, a bonus for signing the contract results in the acqui-
sition of an asset which, having a useful life beyond the end of the
104. See 1976 Hearings, supra note 29, at 637.
105. This distinction can be determined by the terms of the player's contract. For
example, the Uniform Player's Contract for Professional Baseball's National League
states in Clause 2 that:
"For performance of the player's services and promises hereunder the Club will pay
the Player the sum of $ in semi-monthly installments after the commence-
ment of the player season covered by this contract, except as the schedule of payments
may be modified by a special covenant." "Uniform Player's Contract," The National
League of Professional Baseball Clubs.
Clause 2 addresses payment for services in salary terms. A bonus for signing the
contract agreement would be provided for under the special covenant section of the
contract, which follows Clause 12. A challenge by the IRS that the owner was treating
bonus payments as salary expenses would be met by producing the. player contracts in
question.
106. I.R.C. § 162.
107. However, a bonus to sign a one-year contract would not result in the acquisition
of an asset having a useful life of greater than one year.
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taxable year, must be "capitalized" and depreciated. 0 s The payment
of a bonus will also affect the taxation of the athlete.10
Depreciation of a bonus over the useful life of the player contract
will be recaptured if the player contract is sold.1I0 Franchise owners
would rather avoid depreciation and recapture in favor of expensing
all payments made under the contract under section 162. Treating the
player contract as an expense in the year paid theoretically means that
the payment of a bonus resulted in the acquisition of an asset with a
useful life of less than one year. Therefore, by expensing the cost of
the player contract the franchise can deduct the entire amount of the
bonus in the year paid and treat the contract as having a zero cost
basis. Because the contract's usefulness is considered to be fully utilized
after one year there will be no depreciation deductions in later years.
Consequently, there will be no recapture of ordinary income when
the contract is sold. The entire amount received for the contract may
be taxed at the lower capital gains rates under the provisions of section
1231.
There are several ways a franchise owner may avoid the capitaliza-
tion of bonuses for signing player contracts. One technique is to treat
the bonus as a current expense. In 1970, Baltimore Baseball Club, Inc.,
owners of the Baltimore Orioles, took a $1.3 million deduction for team
replacement expenses."' The financial statement included the follow-
ing explanation:
The Internal Revenue Service requires the cost of purchased player
contracts together with payments of certain types of bonuses to be
capitalized and amortized over the estimated number of years that
the individual player can reasonably be expected to play. The com-
pany, however, has always charged these type expenditures to
operations as they were incurred and is continuing to do so.112
It is difficult to ascertain whether other franchises employ the same
tax accounting strategy because, unlike the Orioles, most franchises
108. See Rev. Rul. 67-380, 1967-2 C.B. 291; Rev. Rul. 71-137, 1971-1 C.B. 104.
109. A maximum marginal tax rate of 50% on an individual's earned income is im-
posed by § 1348. Earned income defined under the proposed regulations is "compen-
sation . . . for personal services actually rendered." (Treas. Regs. § 1.1348-3(a)(1) (i),
T.D. 7446, 41 Fed. Reg. 55, 339 (1976) (to be codified in 26 C.F.R. § 1.1348-3(a)(1)
(i)). Therefore, it would appear that a bonus paid to an athlete on signing a contract,
if not predicated on the performance of any services, would not constitute earned in-
come. Rev. Rul. 58-145, 1951-1 C.B. 360, on the other hand, stated that a bonus paid
to an athlete conditions upon the player making the team constituted wages subject to
withholding.
110. See Rev. Rul. 67-380, 1967-2 C.B. 291; Rev. Rul. 71-137, 1971-1 C.B. 104.
111. Okner, supra note 42, at 171.
112. Id. (footnote omitted).
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do not release financial information.''" A franchise accountant inter-
viewed by the authors indicated that the procedure his team employs
is to treat every bonus under $5,000 as an expense.'" 4 Any bonus for
signing above that figure is capitalized and amortized. It has been re-
ported that one other club uses the same procedure, but draws the line
at $20,000.15
A second method for avoiding depreciation and recapture on bo-
nuses is to not offer bonus payments to players. By phrasing the entire
multi-year contract package in terms of "salary", the franchise can
deduct each year's salary outlay as an expense and achieve the desired
goal of maintaining the player's contract at a cost basis of zero. For
example, suppose that during negotiations the player asks for a four-
year no-cut contract calling for a salary of $100,000 per year and a
$100,000 bonus to sign. If the team feels that $500,000 over four years
is fair, they may agree to the money and contract length demanded
provided that the player accepts payment in the form of a salary of
$125,000 per year. Thus, instead of a bonus with a $100,000 book value
subject to recapture, the franchise will, by paying the player the same
amount in the form of a salary, have a zero cost basis in the contract.'"
b. PURCHASING INDIVIDUAL PLAYER CONTRACTS FROM OTHER
FRANCHISES
Owners must also be concerned with the tax consequences of pur-
chasing individual player contracts from other franchises. The cost
basis of a player contract purchased from another franchise is the
amount paid for the contract.'1 7 As we have seen, this amount is then
depreciated over the useful life of the contract.'
A hypothetical will help to illustrate this discussion. Suppose
Player A, a top draft choice, has a three-year no-cut contract with
the Giants. Player A's salary is $100,000 per year. After one season
the Giants become disenchanted with Player A. The club wants to be
relieved of the burden of having to pay another $200,000 to a hapless
113, In 1973, only 14 of our 96 American sports franchises were publicly held cor-
porations. The other franchises were privately held and do not have to prepare certified
financial statements. Id. at 161.
114. This information was obtained in a personal interview with a franchise account-
ant who requested anonymity.
115. Okner, supra note 42, at 171 n.26.
116. The franchise may instead offer the player a $100,000 interest free loan to be
paid back in four years. By giving the player a $125,000 salary and deducting the
$25,000 loan repayment in each of the contract's four years, the same tax result is
achieved.
117. See Rev. Rul. 67-379, 1967-2 C.B. 127; Rev. Rul. 71-137, 1971-1 C.B. 104.
118. Id.
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player they feel should not be riding the bench, much less the team
bus. The Bears, another team in the league, feel that Player A has not
been allowed to reach his athletic potential. They are willing to take
a chance on Player A and to pay the $100,000 per year salary for two
more seasons. The two franchises enter into a transaction whereby
A's contract is purchased by the Bears for $5,000.
The Bears must assign a depreciable cost basis to Player A's con-
tract."" This basis will not be a function of the player's salary. Instead
the IRS requires only that the amounts paid or incurred upon the
purchase of a player contract be depreciated. 0 Therefore, the $5,000
paid for Player A's contract will be the assigned basis depreciated over
the contract's useful life. On the other hand, the Bears will be able to
deduct the entire $100,000 per year salary in the year it is paid as a
business expense under section 162."' Finally, the amount depreciated
against Player A's $5,000 cost basis will, to the extent of gain, be re-
captured should Player A ever be resold by the Bears.12 2
c. ACQUIRING INDIVDUAL PLAYER CONTRACTS THROUGH TRADING
A player-for-player transaction between franchises, where no addi-
tional consideration is involved, is not a taxable event.x13 Such a trade
is considered a "like kind" exchange under section 1031,124 whereby
the cost basis and useful life of a player contract traded remains with
the original franchise and is imputed to the player contract received
with no gain or loss recognized by either franchise. Where either
franchise receives other property or money - commonly known as
"boot" - in addition to the player contract, the gain is taxable to the
extent of the fair market value of the additional "boot". 5
Three examples will help to illustrate the effect of section 1031 on
player contract trades.
Example 1:
Assume that two franchises, the Bears and the Giants, have engaged
in player-for-player trades. In the first transaction the Giants trade
Player A, whose contract has a $10,000 adjusted basis, to the Bears for
Player B, whose contract has a $5,000 adjusted basis. In a straight
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See I.R.C. § 162. This section specifically provides for the deduction of salaries
for personal services rendered in carrying on a trade or business.
122. See I.R.C. § 1245, as amended by 1976 TRA.
123. See Rev. Rul. 67-380, 1967-2 C.B. 291; Rev. Rul. 71-137, 1971-1 C.B. 104.
124. See I.R.C. § 1031(a).
125. See I.R.C. § 1031(b).
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player-for-player trade such as this, each franchise retains the adjusted
basis and useful life of the contract traded. Therefore, the Giants have
Player B subject to a $10,000 cost basis and the Bears own Player A's
contract subject to Player B's former contract basis of $5,000.
Example 2:
Next, assume the Giants are willing to exchange Player A and
$60,000 in cash for Player B. The new cost basis of Player B's contract
to the Giants will be the previous $10,000 basis in Player A's contract
plus the $60,000 paid to acquire Player B."-t" Gain is recognized by the
Bears to the extent of money, or "boot", received. Thus the Bears will
have Player A with a $5,000 cost basis. They will also receive a $60,000
section 1231 gain diminished by the ordinary income recapture of
depreciation written off against Player B's contract.'2 7
Example 3:
Finally assume that Player A of the Giants has a $50,000 adjusted
basis and Player B of the Bears has a $2,000 adjusted basis.128 If the
teams trade contracts with no additional consideration involved, an-
other section 1031 tax-free exchange will transpire.129 This example
highlights the fact that although actual gains and losses may be real-
ized in like kind transactions, section 1031 does not allow them to be
recognized under that tax law.13o
While recapture of depreciation is excluded from section 1031
transactions, section 1245 is not barred from recapturing ordinary in-
come in future transactions involving contracts obtained through player
trades. Should an athlete involved in a straight player-for-player trade
ever be sold at a gain, depreciation taken against the cost basis of his
contract will be recaptured.
d. TRADING A DRAFT CHOICE FOR A PLAYER CONTRACT
The trade of a draft choice for a player contract will probably be
considered a like kind transaction under section 1031.1"1 A future draft
126. See I.R.C. § 1031(d).
127. See 1976 TRA § 1245(b)(4) (amending I.R.C. § 1245).
128. Note that adjusted basis merely reflects the amount left to be depreciated on a
player contract. Adjusted basis is not an indicator of the player's athletic ability. A five-
year veteran may be an outstanding performer and also have a fully depreciated con-
tract with an adjusted basis of zero.
129. I.R.C. § 1031(b).
130. Although it may be unrealistic for the team's general manager to consult their
accountant before making trades, from a tax standpoint it would be more prudent for
the Giants, in this situation, to sell Player A's contract to the Bears for $2,000 and ob-
tain a deductible $48,000 contract sale loss under I.R.C. § 165.
,131. A similar transaction, the exchange of an option to purchase realty for realty,
is not considered a like kind exchange. This is because the courts have held that there
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choice, however, has no cost basis. Therefore, a franchise trading a
draft choice receives a player contract subject to a cost basis of zero.
The franchise receiving the draft choice has an asset with a basis the
same as the adjusted basis of the player contract traded. If the player
whom it later drafts is signed and given a non-deductible bonus, the
basis of this new contract will be adjusted upward to include the value
of the bonus in addition to the basis of the player contract traded. If
the player contract is ever sold, section 1245 will recapture depreciation
taken against the cost basis of the bonus and of the player contract
traded.
e. ABANDONMENT OF INDIVIDUAL PLAYER CONTRACTS
A franchise is entitled to claim an abandonment loss under section
165132 in the year a player is cut or retires. The amount of ordinary
loss that can be deducted is the adjusted basis of the player's contract.
Depreciation deductions written off against ordinary income in prior
years cannot be recaptured when the contract is abandoned. 33
2. RECAPTURE OF DEPRECIATION UPON SALE OF THE
FRANCHISE
Prior to the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, recapture of
depreciation taken on player contracts transfered in bulk upon the
sale of a franchise could be ascertained simply by applying the section
1245 formula. Under that formula, the seller of a franchise was sub-
ject to ordinary income taxation on the lower of recomputed basis
or amount realized that exceeded adjusted basis on each individual
contract. This recapture method will be referred as the contract-by-
contract method. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 institutes a new pro-
is a sharp distinction between the character of rights held by an optionee and an owner
of an interest in property. Valleskey v. Nelson, 168 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. Wis. 1958),
aff'd 271 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1959). Christensen v. Wisconsin Dept. of Taxation, 4 Wis.
B.T.A. 43 (1949). However, an owner's rights to a draft choice and a player contract
are not dissimilar. A draft choice represents the exclusive right an owner has to deal
with one player to be chosen. The player chosen must, for a certain time at least, nego-
tiate and contract solely with the selecting owner or not sign a contract at all. Likewise,
a player under contract is the exclusive property of the owner. The player under con-
tract may not contract with or athletically perform for other owners. A draft choice
and a player contract should be considered like kind property because they are both
basically an owner's right to specific personal service contracts. There is no case law on
this matter and resolution must await future litigation. A detailed analysis of I.R.C. §
1031 and its applicability to draft choices is beyond the scope of this note.
132. I.R.C. § 165, as amended by 1976 TRA.
133. This is because the fair market value of the abandoned contract is zero. There-
fore, the amount realized from the transaction does not exceed the adjusted basis of
the contract. In such a situation ordinary income is not recaptured by I.R.C. § 1245.
[Vol. 1258 COMM/Ewr
cedure for determining sports franchise sale recapture by the addition
of subsection 1245(a) (4). This new subsection does not alter any of
the aforementioned recapture procedures involving individual player
contract transactions."'
The new rule for player contracts dictates that when a franchise
is sold the amount to be recaptured is determined by computing the
recomputed basis for each of two classifications of player contracts,
and then substracting the greater recomputed basis figure from the
adjusted basis. Section 1245 (a) (4) defines recomputed basis as the
greater of the previously unrecaptured depreciation on player contracts
the buyer is now purchasing with the franchise or the player contracts
the seller originally purchased with the franchise, increased by the
adjusted basis of such contracts. Once the greater recomputed basis
figure is determined, it is compared with the amount realized from
the sale of player contracts. The lesser amount is then used to compute
recapture according to general section 1245 procedures.
a. COMPUTATION OF RECOMPUTED BASIS ON CONTRACTS
INVOLVED IN THE TRANSFER
i) Explanation of subsection 1245(a) (4) (C)
The discussion will focus first on how to calculate the recomputed
basis on those contracts held by the taxpayer which are purchased by
the franchise buyer. As prescribed by subsection 1245(a) (4) (C), one
first computes the amount of unrecaptured depreciation on the player
contracts involved in the current transfer. This figure is reduced by the
amount of depreciation previously recaptured on contracts disposed of
by the present owner which he obtained upon acquisition of the fran-
chise. Assuming that there has been no recapture on contracts the
present owner acquired when he originally purchased the franchise,
the recomputed basis will equal the adjusted basis and the aggregate
depreciation taken on all contracts held at the time of sale. This method
of computation may result in a greater recomputed basis than under
the contract-by-contract method used under prior law.
An example will help to illustrate the application of subsection
1245(a) (4) (c). Suppose the Bears franchise is being sold for $2 mil-
lion. The seller purchased the Bears five years ago for $1.2 million. Of
that amount, $650,000 was allocated by the current seller for the pur-
chase of five player contracts. The seller now is allocating $1 million,
fifty percent of the Bears' sale price, to the sale of seven player con-
tracts. Only three of the contracts, those of Players A, B and C, held
134. See 1976 REPORT, supra note 8, at 90.
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at the time of sale are subject to recapture. 1 3  Further assume that
both Players A and B were sold to the seller when he purchased the
franchise five years ago. At that time, seller allocated $200,000 to
Player A and $100,000 to Player B. Having used a five-year useful
life,1 36 the seller has fully depreciated both Players A and B's contracts.
According to section 1056(c) of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, when
the franchise is sold the transferor must furnish the Secretary and the
transferee with the amount which he believes to be the adjusted basis
of the contract and the gain recognized on the transfer of the contracts.
Since both contracts have been fully depreciated, the adjusted basis
will be zero. Assume that Players A and B are old and used sparingly,
and that the owner wants to avoid recapture. The owner allocates
$10,000 to each of their contracts. This figure represents the amount
of gain recognized by the owner on the transfer of the contracts.
Assume Player C was acquired three years after the seller's original
purchase of the franchise. Player C received a $100,000 bonus to sign
his contract. He has played for two seasons, and after $40,000 of de-
preciation deductions has a $60,000 adjusted basis. In his first year,
Player C was voted rookie of the year and led the league in scoring
in his sophmore season. On the basis of his past performance and future
potential, the seller realistically assigns a $500,000 sale price to his
contract. This figure represents the $60,000 adjusted basis in the con-
trant and a $440,000 gain recognized on the transfer of the contract
required to be disclosed by section 1056(c).
Before the Tax Reform Act of 1976, recapture would have been
determined on a contract-by-contract basis. The seller would first de-
termine the recomputed basis and the amount realized on each indi-
vidual contract. Then by subtracting the contract's adjusted basis from
the lesser of these two amounts, the ordinary income to be recaptured
was computed. The amount realized would be utilized in our example
above for the contracts of Players A and B, because that amount is
less than each of their recomputed bases. The $10,000 gain recognized
on each contract would then be subtracted from the adjusted basis of
each contract, which in this case is zero. Therefore, $10,000 would be
recaptured on each of Players A and B's contracts. On the other hand,
the $100,000 recomputed basis is lower than the $500,000 realized on
Player C's contract and would thus be reduced by the $60,000 adjusted
135. In this example, the franchise has consciously sought to avoid the possibility of
recapture by signing most players to contracts that do not include bonuses for signing.
136. The useful life of a player contract obviously depends upon the player's athletic
potential. For the purposes of discussion, a five-year useful life will be utilized unless
specifically noted.
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basis. The recapture of ordinary income on Player C's contract would
amount to $40,000. Thus, for Players A, B and C, a total of $60,000
would be recaptured using the former procedure.
The section 1245 (a) (4) (C) method of determining recomputed
basis avoids looking at each contract in favor of including all deprecia-
tion deductions taken on all contracts in one recomputed basis figure.
This figure, if lower than the amount realized, is reduced by the total
adjusted basis of the contracts involved. The new provision results in
$340,000 ordinary income recapture in this example.
Compare:
Contract Cost
Depreciation
Adjusted Basis
Depreciation
Recomputed Basis
Amount Realized
(Sale Price Al-
located by Owner)
Lesser of Recom-
puted Basis and
Amount Realized
$200
$200
Contract-by-Contract
Method
AkB
,000 $100,000 $10
,000 100,000 4
0
200,000
200,000
10,000
0
100,000
100,000
10,000
C
0,00
0,00
60,00
40,00
100,0(
500,00
Subsection
1245(a) (4) (C)
All three Contracts
0 $400,000
0 340,000
0 60,000
0 340,000
0 400,000
0 520,000
10,000 10,000 100,000 400,000
Less Adjusted
Basis
Recapture on each
contract
Total Recapture
0 0 60,000
10,000 10,000 40,000
60,000
By aggregating the recomputed basis of all the contracts together
the seller will have $340,000 of ordinary income recaptured compared
with only $60,000 under the previous contract-by-contract method.
Subsection 1245(a) (4) (C) will not recapture greater amounts of
depreciation than was possible under prior law. The contract-by-con-
tract method recaptures the same amount as subsection 1245(a) (4) (C)
60,000
340,000
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whenever the recomputed basis of each contract is utilized to deter-
mine ordinary income tax liability. In our example, if the seller allocated
$200,000 or more to Player A's contract and $100,000 or more to each
of the contracts of Players B and C, he would be subject to recapture
on the entire $340,000 depreciation deduction regardless of which
method was applied. The subsection 1245 (a) (4) (C) method of re-
capture is no more burdensome upon the franchise owner than the
previous contract-by-contract method.
ii) Avoidance of Recapture Through Allocation To Non-Depreciable
Contracts a
Like the contract-by-contract method, the franchise owner may
avoid the heavy recapture burden imposed by section 1245(a) (4) (C)
by taking advantage of the avoidance possibilities that arise under
section 1056. Complying with section 1056 can be viewed as a two-step
process. First the player contracts asset allocation, subject to the sub-
section 1056(d) presumption, is determined. Secondly, the seller must
break down this evaluation into specific allocations for each player con-
tract. Subsection 1056(c) requires that the buyer abide by the seller's
individual player contract allocations.
The determination of the first figure will greatly affect each party's
future tax liability. As discussed previously, the seller and buyer en-
gaged in a franchise transfer are both interested in the value allocated
to the player contracts asset. It is in the seller's interest to allocate as
little as possible to player contracts if some contracts are subject to
recapture. On the other hand, the buyer wishes to allocate a high
percentage to player contracts so that he may depreciate a large portion
of the franchise acquisition cost.
The amount the seller allocates to player contracts will be an im-
portant financial consideration in any franchise transfer. If the seller
has expensed, rather than capitalized and depreciated, those contracts
involved in the transfer, he will not be subject to subsection 1245(a)
(4) (C) recapture. As discussed supra, a seller in this situation is there-
fore not adversely affected by a large allocation to the player contract
asset. By agreeing to a high allocation the seller may be able to com-
mand a greater franchise sale price. This is because a franchise which
has a large percentage allocated to player contracts is worth more to
a buyer due to depreciation benefits than is a franchise with a low
allocation.
A seller that has depreciated player contracts involved in the trans-
fer is in a more dfficult position. If the seller allocates a small portion
of the sale price to player contracts he avoids recapture, but makes the
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franchise less attractive to the buyer. By allocating a large percentage
to the player contracts asset the franchise is worth more to the buyer,
yet the seller is subject to greater recapture liability. However, under
the new law this dilemma may be avoided. The seller who is subject
to recapture on contracts involved in the transfer may both allocate
a large percent to player contracts and reduce recapture liability. This
can be accomplished through the knowledgeable allocation of values
to specific player contracts.
It will be noted that the second step allocation of the aggregate
player contracts asset into individual player contract allocations is of
greater importance to the franchise seller than to the franchise buyer.
Once the parties have agreed upon the player contracts asset alloca-
tion, the buyer knows the total amount of player acquisition costs he
may depreciate. The components of that aggregate depreciable figure
are not crucial. For example, suppose $600,000 in player contracts are
purchased in a franchise sale and are to be depreciated over a five
year useful life. The depreciation deduction on one $500,000 contract
and one $100,000 contract or on two $300,000 player contracts will
both equal $120,000. The buyer's primary concern is securing the high-
est aggregate player contracts asset allocation possible so that he can
depreciate a large percentage of the franchise acquisition cost in the
future.
On the other hand, the seller is greatly interested in the amount
allocated to each contract because, through adroit allocation, recapture
can be avoided. This is accomplished by allocating more of the aggre-
gate player contract purchase price to those contracts which had a
zero cost basis and thus were non-depreciable. Therefore, the amount
realized on the remaining depreciable contracts will be reduced. If the
reduction causes the total amount on depreciable contracts to fall
below the combined recomputed basis of such contracts, the seller will
be able to avoid a certain amount of ordinary income recapture.
The seller, according to subsection 1056(c), is in a position to allo-
cate amongst depreciable and non-depreciable contracts. As previously
indicated, subsection 1056(c) requires that the seller furnish informa-
tion to the IRS concerning the adjusted basis and the gain on each
player contract in the sale of a franchise. If the IRS does not challenge
these statements, the seller will be able to escape or diminish recapture
while allocating a large portion of the purchase price to the sale of
player contracts for the buyer's benefit.
The example of the Bear franchise sale serves to illustrate this point.
As previously stated, the seller is allocating $1 million, or fifty percent
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of the Bears' sale price, to the sale of seven player contracts. The con-
tracts of Players A, B and C are depreciable and thus subject to re-
capture. Players W, X, Y and Z were neither purchased or offered
bonuses to sign. Their contracts call for yearly salaries and are thus
not depreciable. Again, the seller allocates $10,000 to each of Players
A and B's contracts. However, he only places a $60,000 sale price on
star Player C's contract instead of the $500,000 value in the previous
example. The remaining $920,000 of the $1 million player contract
sale price is allocated among the four non-depreciable contracts. Be-
cause Players W, X, Y and Z's contracts are non-depreciable, they have
no adjusted basis and are treated as a gain recognized on the transfer.
By allocating the major portion of the contract sale price to non-
depreciable contracts, the amount realized on depreciable contracts
is reduced. In this example, a reduction from $520,000 to $80,000 brings
the amount realized figure to a total well below the stationary recom-
puted basis amount. Therefore, according to subsection 1245(a) (1),
recapture will be determined by subtracting the adjusted basis from
the amount realized.
Subsection 1245(a) (4) (C) Allocation to Non-
Original Allocation Depreciable Contracts
ABC WXYZ ABC WXYZ
Contract Cost $400,000 0 $400,000 0
Depreciation 340,000 0 340,000 0
Adjusted Basis 60,000 0 60,000 0
Depreciation 340,000 0 340,000 0
Recomputed
Basis 400,000 0 400,000 0
Amount
Realized 520,000 480,000 80,000 920,000
Lesser of Re-
computed
Basis and
Amount real-
ized 400,000 - 80,000 -
Less Adjusted
Basis 60,000 - 60,000 -
Recapture 340,000 - 20,000 -
264 COMu/ENT [Vol. I
TRA '76: SPORTS FRANCHISE OWNERSHIP
As the example indicates, the seller will be able to significantly re-
duce recapture of ordinary income tax liability by allocating gain to
non-depreciable player contracts, subject to section 1231 treatment.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 attempts to deal with the conversion
of ordinary income into capital gain.137 The subsection 1056(c) pro-
vision requiring buyer and seller to abide by the seller's player contract
valuations will, in an arms length transaction, force the seller to at-
tribute a greater share of the sale price to player contracts. Conse-
quently, the seller will be limited in both the amount of the sale price
he can allocate to non-depreciable franchise rights and the amount of
recapture he can avoid. However, by 1) allowing the seller to allocate
gain to the sale price of individual player contracts under subsection
1056(c) and 2) redefining only "recomputed basis" and not "amount
realized" under subsection 1245(a) (4), the Tax Reform Act of 1976
does not effectively provide for recapture of depreciation on contracts
involved in the transfer of a franchise. The aforementioned provisions,
combined with the fact that some contracts involved in a franchise
transfer will be non-depreciable, allow the seller the same benefit he
had before the Tax Reform Act of 1976 was enacted. Where previously,
he could allocate between depreciable contracts and non-depreciable
franchise rights to avoid recapture, the seller can now allocate, subject
to IRS scrutiny, between depreciable and non-depreciable contracts
to accomplish the same objective.
iii) The Allocation to Non-Depreciable Contracts
Loophole: Possible Solutions
To discourage the seller's allocation to non-depreciable contracts
the government may seek to redefine the term "amount realized" as
it is used in the computation of recapture of depreciation deductions
taken on player contracts transferred as part of a franchise sale. The
government can deal with this potential subsection 1245(a) (4) (C)
loophole by enacting an appropriate amendment to the Internal
Revenue Code or by the promulgation of strict regulations.
A possible amendment alternative would be to specifically define
the "amount realized" for subsection 1245(a) (4) purposes as the
amount of the franchise sale price allocated to the aggregate player
contracts asset. With such a mass asset redefinition of the subsection
1245(a) "amount realized" formula, a seller would no longer be able
137. See 1976 REPORT, supra note 8, at 89.
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to arbitrarily allocate gain to the non-depreciable contracts. Instead,
the amount realized would be the total amount which seller receives
from the buyer for the player contracts asset. Such legislation would
not work unfairly against the seller. As has been noted, the seller is
taxed on the lower of recomputed basis or amount realized less ad-
justed basis under section 1245. If the portion of the purchase price
allocated to the player contracts asset were greater than the total de-
preciation, the seller would be subject to recapture on the amount of
the recomputed basis less the adjusted basis. If the allocation to player
contracts is less than the depreciation deductions taken by the seller,
the amount realized from the contracts, less the adjusted basis, would
be subject to recapture. Therefore, the seller can never have ordinary
income recaptured in excess of his aggregate depreciation deductions.
Since the intent of Congress in refashioning section 1245 was to prevent
the conversion of ordinary income into capital gain, 38 a special defini-
tion of amount realized for subsection 1245(a) (4) would be consistent
with that intent.
The IRS may also act to discourage a seller's arbitrary allocation to
non-depreciable contracts by issuing a regulation concerning the de-
termination of gain on individual player contracts. Subsection 1056(c)
(2) requires the seller of a franchise to furnish the IRS with the amount
of gain realized on each contract in the sale of a franchise. By requiring
the seller to employ an independent appraiser for this evaluation and
through careful IRS scrutiny of all franchise sales reports, the seller's
avoidance of recapture may be precluded.
b. COMPUTATION OF RECOMPUTED BASIS ON CONTRACTS ORIGINALLY
PURCHASED WIH THE FRANCHISE
i) Explanation of subsection 1245(a) (4) (B)
Under the new provision, section 1245 (a) (4) (A) dictates that the
recomputed basis figure used by the seller is the lagest of two alterna-
tive computations under subsection 1245(a) (4) (B) and (C). The
determination of the recomputed basis on contracts involved in a
current transfer according to subsection 1245(a) (4) (C) has been dis-
cussed. The mechanics of how the recomputed basis on contracts
acquired by the seller in the original purchase of the franchise is com-
puted under subsection 1245(a) (4) (B) remain to be explored. Basic-
ally, one must first aggregate all depreciation and loss deductions taken
138. Id.
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on contracts initially acquired. That figure is then diminished by the
total ordinary income recaptured on previous sales of such contracts.
The remainder is then added to the currently held contracts' adjusted
basis. The resulting figure is the recomputed basis.
Before fully discussing this provision it should be noted that the
potential problem of a seller allocating gain to non-depreciable con-
tracts arising under subsection 1245(a)(4)(C) will not affect the
computation of recomputed basis under subsection 1245(a) (4) (B).
Subsection 1245(a)(4) (A) calls for the greater of two recomputed
bases to be applied. Only when the greater of the two computations is
chosen is the amount realized on the transaction a factor in final recap-
ture determination. Therefore, the allocation of gain to non-depreciable
contracts, which affects the amount realized on depreciable contracts,
will not interfere with the correct determination of subsection 1245
(a) (4) (B) recomputed basis. Furthermore, if subsection 1245(a) (4)
(B) recomputed basis is greater than subsection 1245(a) (4) (C) re-
computed basis, the allocation of gain to non-depreciable contracts
loophole will not be available to the seller. This is because subsection
1245(a) (4) (B) recaptures depreciation on contracts initially acquired
with the franchise. Since the seller purchased these contracts with the
franchise they are all depreciable.' " Thus, the seller will not be able
to allocate gain to non-depreciable contracts, since none were held
at the time of purchase.
A return to the example of the Bears franchise sale will help illus-
trate how recapture under subsection 1245(a) (4) (B) applies. When
the Bears franchise was purchased by the seller, $650,000 of the total
franchise price was allocated to the purchase of the contracts of Players
A, B, D, E and F. Of the five players originally purchased, Players A
and B remained with the Bears the full five years the seller owned the
team. Since the owner depreciated the player contracts over a five-year
useful life, the contracts on Players A and B are fully depreciated. As-
sume that dollar figure under subsection 1245(a) (4) (B) is greater than
that under 1245(a) (4) (C) and the amount realized on the sale is
greater than the recomputed basis. The subsection 1245(a) (4) (B)
recomputed basis figure is, therefore, appropriate for this franchise
sale. The seller's previously unrecaptured depreciation according to
subsection 1245(a) (4) (B) (i) includes "the sum of the deduction al-
139. See Rev. Rul. 67-380, 1967-2 C.B. 291; Rev. Rul. 71-137, 1971-1 C.B. 104.
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lowed or allowable to the taxpayer transferor for the depreciation of
any player contracts acquired by him at the time of acquisition of such
franchise."140 Thus, the total amount depreciated on the contracts of
Players A and B-$300,000 will be included in the sellers' unrecaptured
deductions.
Player D remained with the Bears for one season. The management
depreciated one-fifth of his $100,000 contract leaving an $80,000 ad-
justed basis. At the end of the taxable year, but before the second
season resumed, the Bears sold player D for $10,000 realizing a contract
sale loss of $70,000.141 A contract sale loss, which is subject to section
1231 treatment, is included in the seller's recomputed basis according
to subsection 1245(a) (4) (B) (i) upon the sale of the franchise. Fur-
thermore, the $20,000 depreciation deduction taken in the first year is
subject to recapture.
Player E's contract was purchased from the original franchise for
$100,000. Having been a Bear for two years, Player E had an adjusted
basis of $60,000. At the end of her second year she retired for religious
reasons. When a player retires or is cut, the franchise may take an
abandonment loss for that year.'4 2 Hence, the Bears deducted $60,000
in their second year. However, when the franchise is sold not only the
depreciation taken but also an abandonment loss deduction on an
originally acquired contract will be subject to recapture under sub-
section 1245(a) (4) (B). The seller of the Bears will, therefore, be
subject to recapture on the entire $100,000 cost basis of Player E's
contract.
The entire amount depreciated will not always be included in the
subsection 1245(a) (4) (B) recomputed basis. Section 1245(a) (4) (B)
(ii) reduces the recomputed basis by the previously recaptured de-
preciation on contracts acquired with the franchise. Assume Player
F's contract cost basis is $150,000 and was sold for $200,000 after one
year. The new provision first included the $30,000 first year deprecia-
tion deduction in the aggregate recomputed basis and then subtracts
the same $30,000 under subsection 1245(a) (4) (B) (ii) as having been
previously recaptured at the end of year one.
140. See 1976 TRA § 1245(a) (4) (B) (i) (amending I.R.C. § 1245).
141. See I.R.C. § 165 as amended by 1976 TRA.
142. Id.
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Subsection 1245(a) (4) (B) Method
A B D E F Total
Contract Cost 200,000 100,000 100,000 100,000 150,000 650,000
Total
Depreciation 200,000 100,000 20,000 40,000 130,00 390,000
Contract Sale
Loss 70,000 70,000
Abandonment Loss 60,000 60,000
Aggregate subsection
1245(a)(4)(B)(i) Deductions 520,000
Less subsection 1245
(a) (4) (B) (ii) deduction
for previously recaptured
depreciation 30,000 30,000
Total subsection 1245
(a) (4) (B) Deductions 490,000
ii) Choice of Adjusted Basis
The chart above indicates that the sum of deductions arrived at
under subsection 1245(a) (4) (B) is $490,000. By adding this figure
to the adjusted basis the recomputed basis can be obtained. According
to subsection 1245(a) (4) (A) the figure to be used is the adjusted
basis of the player contracts involved in the transfer. The utilization
of the currently held contracts' adjusted basis instead of the adjusted
basis of the contracts initially purchased may work to the seller's ad-
vantage. Whenever recomputed basis is less than amount realized and
the same adjusted basis figure is used to compute the recomputed basis
and the recapture the employment of either adjusted basis figure will
not affect the recapture liability.143
A return to the example of the Bears franchise sale will help to
illustrate this point. The total subsection 1245(a) (4) (B) deductions
in the Bears sale equalled $490,000. The adjusted basis of contracts
involved in the transfer is $60,000, whereas the adjusted basis of those
fully depreciated contracts acquired upon acquisition of the franchise
is zero. By adding an adjusted basis to the $490,000 in deductions, re-
computed basis is derived. By subtracting this adjusted basis from
recomputed basis the correct recapture amount will be ascertained.
143. I.R.C. § 1245.
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Adjusted Basis of
Contracts Involved
in the Transfer
Total Subsection
1245(a)(4)(B) Deductions
Adjusted Basis
Recomputed Basis
Adjusted Basis
Recapture
$490,000
60,000
550,000
60,000
490,000
Adjusted Basis of
Contracts Acquired
with the
Franchise
$490,000
0
490,000
0
490,000
However, when the amount realized is less than recomputed basis,
recapture is affected by the Section 1245(a) (4) (A) choice of ad-
justed basis figures for currently held contracts. Using the same facts
as above, suppose the amount realized is $480,000. The seller, by using
the $60,000 adjusted basis of contracts involved in the transfer, is able
to avoid some recapture liability.
Adjusted Basis of
Contracts Involved in
the Transfer
Adjusted Basis of
Contracts Originally
Acquired with
the Franchise
Total Subsection
1245(a) (4) (B)
Deductions
Adjusted Basis
Recomputed Basis
Amount Realized
Lesser of Amount
Realized and
Recomputed Basis
Adjusted Basis
Recapture
$490,000
60,000
550,000
480,000
480,000
60,000
420,000
$490,000
0
490,000
480,000
480,000
0
480,000
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The seller is also benefitted from the statute's choice of adjusted
basis figures in that the burden of recordkeeping and documentation
is eased. By not having to ascertain the adjusted bases of the contracts
of players long since retired, the franchise will be able to avoid time-
consuming, and possibly fruitless, record searches. The adjusted basis
of contracts currently held, on the other hand, is information which a
franchise will have close at hand.
iii) Extent of Recapture Liability Under
Subsection 1245(a) (4) (B)
Returning to the discussion of the Bears franchise sale, the recom-
puted basis calculated under the subsection 1245(a) (4) (B) method
is 490,000. The recomputed basis arrived at under the subsection 1245
(a) (4) (C) method is $400,00. Subsection 1245(a) (4) (A) directs the
seller to use the larger recomputed basis of the contracts involved in
the transfer or of the contracts originally acquired. Therefore, in our
example the subsection 1245(a) (4) (B) recomputed basis for origin-
ally purchased contracts will be utilized. It should be noted that the
actual recapture figure is not determined by the subsection 1245(a)
(4) method used. The new provision merely redefines recomputed
basis. Thus, once the appropriate recomputed basis figure has been
selected, the general section 1245 recapture rules involving the com-
paring of recomputed basis and amount realized and subtracting ad-
justed basis from the lower of those two figures become operative.
.In the Bears franchise sale example, of the $650,000 allocated to
the purchase of player contracts when seller acquired the franchise,
$490,000 will be recaptured in the franchise transfer. Another $30,000,
representing Player F's recaptured contract, has previously been treated
as ordinary income. This leaves $130,000 not recaptured - the $10,000
received from Player D's contract sale and the $120,000 not depreciated
on Player F's contract. As has been demonstrated, the extent of sub-
section 1245(a) (4) (B) recapture liability is very broad. Generally,
when the player contracts asset sale price exceeds the subsection 1245
(a) (4) (B) recomputed basis, every depreciation or loss deduction
taken on originally purchased contracts will be recaptured.
The consequences of the Bears franchise sale example are as follows.
The entire franchise was sold for $2 million, of which $1 million was
allocated to the purchase of player contracts. The recomputed basis
of the player contracts was less than amount realized from their sale,
therefore subsection 1245(a) (4) recaptured the greater of the two
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amounts. Under subsection 1245(a) (4) (B) $490,000 would be re-
captured on player contracts acquired upon seller's acquisition of the
franchise. Subsection 1245(a) (4) (C) would recapture $340,000 on
player contracts involved in the transfer. Therefore, the seller in our
example will realize gain of $2 million of which $490,000 will be taxed
at ordinary income rates and the balance as capital gain.
C. EFFECT OF SUBSECTION 1245(a) (4)
i) Effect upon a Less Than 100% transfer of the Franchise
A franchise owner will not fall within the less burdensome general
recapture rules when a large percentage, but not the entire franchise,
is sold. The Senate Finance Committee foresaw the possibility of an
owner retaining a minority interest in the team in order to escape the
new franchise sale provision. Its report attempts to eliminate this
method of subsection 1245 (a) (4) avoidance by stating that "it is in-
tended that the sale of a substantial portion of the assets will be treated
as the sale of the entire sports franchise."' "
ii) Effect upon Franchise Transfers
Subsection 1245(a) (4) was enacted in part because the concern
was with the conversion of ordinary income into capital gain.'14 Owners
were able to convert ordinary income into capital gains by fully de-
preciating the player contracts. Then when the franchise was sold,
many, if not all, contracts were subject to capital gains taxation.
In the example above, the seller of the club allocated $650,000 to
the purchase of player contracts upon purchasing the Bears. The sel-
ler, in a five-year period, was able to either depreciate or claim losses
on these contracts totaling $490,000. Upon sale of the franchise, the
pre-1976 contract-by-contract method recaptured ordinary income only
on those contracts held at the time of sale. The previous depreciation
deductions on retired contracts were ignored. As a result, $60,000 was
recaptured out of the $1 million allocated to the sale of player contracts.
The remaining $940,000 would be taxed at capital gain rates. There-
fore, while $490,000 in depreciation and losses were deducted from
ordinary income in the first five years of ownership, only $60,000 was
subject to ordinary income recapture when the team was sold. The
$430,000 difference between the two figures is the amount which was
deducted against ordinary income in the last five years and was then
144. See 1976 REPORT, supra note 8, at 90.
145. Id. at 89.
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taxed at capital gains rates. Such a conversion from ordinary income
to capital gains offered a considerable tax benefit.14 6
The other major tax benefit associated with sports franchise invest-
ments, the sheltering of taxable ordinary income, also occurred in the
first few years of team ownership. Purchasers of sports franchises made
it their practice to allocate a high percentage of the acquisition cost
to player contracts. When this large amount was depreciated over a
short useful life, the deductions in the early years of ownership in most
cases were greater than the yearly franchise profit. Thus, the owner
had a tax loss. As discussed previously, a loss incurred in the operation
of a sports franchise will shelter other taxable income the owner may
have.
In sum, the main tax benefits of sports franchise ownership were
to be found in the first few years of ownership. These benefits, the
conversion of ordinary income to capital gain and the sheltering of
income, were made possible by the depreciation of player contracts.
As previously illustrated, if the recomputed basis of contracts involved
in the transfer is greater than the recomputed basis of contracts origin-
ally acquired, and if this figure is less than the amount realized, the
conversion of ordinary income to capital gain may still be accomplished
by allocating gain to non-depreciable contracts. However, assuming
that the seller cannot or does not allocate in such a manner or, as dis-
cussed above, the government prohibits such allocations, section 1245
(a) (4) will limit the tax advantages of team ownership. The new pro-
vision frustrates the short-term purchaser who had planned to shelter
other ordinary income by fully depreciating a large share of the pur-
chase price allocable to player contracts over a short useful life and
then selling the franchise subject to capital gain taxation.
Subsection 1245(a) (4) will also affect the long-term owner at-
tempting to sell the club.'14 Although the deferral of income through
depreciation is still possible, the lack of conversion benefit reduces
the value of the franchise. Furthermore, the franchise owner may now
be subject to recapture on the contracts originally acquired. As men-
tioned, up to ninety percent of the purchase prices of some franchises
146. In our example, $430,000 taxed at the maximum ordinary income tax rate of
70% yields $301,000 in ordinary income tax liability, whereas the same amount taxed
at the maximum capital gains rate of 35% yields only $150,500 in capital gains tax.
147. I.R.C. § 1245(a)(4) upset sports franchise owners. "An effort was made by
lobbying groups to get a time limit put on it - to say they wouldn't go back more
than 5 or 10 years. Another idea was to provide for a future grandfather clause, to
say that if you held a time 10 years there would be no recapture." Maher, New Law
Cuts Owners' Tax Benefits, L.A. Times, Nov. 30, 1976, sec. 3, at 9, col. 1.
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have been allocated to player contracts. Assume the amount allocated
to the purchase of the player contracts in a proposed sale is high as
well. The owner may be subject to a large amount of ordinary income
tax due to either the amount realized in the transfer or to the recom-
puted basis of contracts initially acquired.
The effect, then, of subsection 1245(a) (4) is to discourage the sale
of sports franchises. The potential short-term owner will not be as will-
ing to invest in a franchise because the conversion of ordinary income
to capital gain through player contract depreciation is now subject to
recapture. The long-term owner will be less likely to sell or will be
forced to attempt to sell at a higher price in order to realize a desired
post-tax amount, because the amount depreciated from the high per-
centage allocated to player contracts initially acquired is now taxed
at ordinary income rates.
Conclusion
Thus, the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 has worked sub-
stantial changes on the rules regulating the taxation of professional
sport franchises. These changes follow the general spirit of the Tax
Reform Act of 1976 which was largely devoted to the curtailment of
tax shelters. Subsection 1056(c) to a great extent limits the allocation
manipulations by the franchise buyer and seller, and thus limits buyer's
depreciable cost basis and increases seller's recapture liability. It has
been shown, however, that this limitation is viable only when the cir-
cumstances are such that the seller is interested in the outcome of the
allocation. It has been argued that the fifty percent presumtion of sub-
section 1056(d) is unreasonably and unrealistically low when taken at
face value. Furthermore, the viability of this subsection in effecting tax
reform will depend upon the burden of proof required of buyer by the
IRS to rebut this presumption. With regard to this presumption, the
IRS thus has the opportunity to either effect good tax law from an
overly-broad and inclusive legislative enactment, or to make the worst
of a bad situation by stringently holding franchise buyers to a fifty
percent allocation.
The effectiveness of subsection 1245(a) (4) will depend upon how
closely the IRS scrutinizes franchise transfers. If the IRS does not
challenge individual player contract allocations, the seller may avoid
recapture under subsection 1245(a) (4) (C) by allocating gain to non-
depreciable contracts. However, that method of recapture avoidance
is not possible under subsection 1245(a) (4) (B). As discussed, subsec-
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tion 1245(a) (4) (B) will effectively recapture depreciation taken on
contracts initially acquired with the franchise.
Close and consistent IRS scrutiny of franchise transfers will limit
the conversion of ordinary income into capital gain benefit previously
associated with sports franchises. The lack of the conversion benefit
may discourage the sale by potential sellers and reduce the attractive-
ness to potential buyers of sports franchises. Yet unlike many invest-
ments, ownership of a sports franchise is not dictated entirely by profits
and taxes. There are other considerations for the potential investor,
such as the thrill and public notoriety of being involved in professional
sports," 8 which may transcend the restrictive effect of sections 1056
and 1245(a) (4).
148. Block, So, You Want To Own a Ball Club, FORBES, April 1, 1977, at 38.
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